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1 Introduction 
The following thesis is concerned with the extensive labour market reforms in Germany 2003-2005, 
namely the ‘Hartz’ reforms. It provides a qualitative analysis of the role of discourse and employs 
an ideational power theory in order to illuminate the reasons for the emergence of these reforms. 
This chapter will introduce the research objectives with its research question. Elaborating on the 
scientific and societal relevance highlights the relevance of this study and the chapter will conclude 
with an overview of the structure of the study at hand. 
  
 1.1 Research Goals 
Since the 1990s the Netherlands and Denmark have become “model cases of welfare reform in 
western Europe’’ (Cox, 2001: 463). The reforms included tax reforms as well as significant changes 
in the pension system and profound labour market policies. At the same time, Germany was seen as 
the “sick man of the euro” (Economist, 1999) and the government formed by chancellor Helmut 
Kohl was reluctant to start the apparently necessary reforms. 
Both the Netherlands and Denmark moved away from a universal provision, but towards more 
target oriented types of policies which only incorporate the ones that are truly in need of welfare 
assistance (Cox, 2001). In contrast to that, Germany only managed to implement small welfare state 
reforms which were merely small adjustments of the existing policies. A striking example is the 
German reform of the pension system in 1989 only hours before the Berlin Wall fell (Cox, 2001). 
Instead of introducing a second pillar in the pension system and shifting responsibilities towards the 
household side, they simply adjusted it slightly in order to secure it for the next few decades to 
come. However, these decisions were made under wrong assumptions. Cox argues, by pointing to 
the Deutsche Mark reform in 1991, that unification posed a possibility to achieve drastic reforms 
rather than an obstacle for doing so. At least from nowadays perspective, the question why 
Germany did not initiate the necessary welfare state reforms, but rather rooted for continuity over 
change imposes itself on every researcher concerned with welfare state reform. 
The differences become even more visible when labour market policies get into focus. Almost all 
western European countries were struggling with the first crises and their aftermath after the post 
World War 2 boom. Germany, Netherlands and Denmark were no exceptions. But again, Denmark 
and Netherlands seeing the necessity of reforms of the welfare state, were able to reform the labour 
market. Germany still had to fight with unemployment rates of 11,2% in 2005 while the 
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Netherlands and Denmark were at 4,7% and 4,8%, respectively (OECD, 2016). While all three 
countries had to face high unemployment in the early 90s, the active employment policy of 
Denmark and Netherlands has quickly proved itself successful. In Germany unemployment became 
the main issue with unemployment rates of already above 9% in the mid and late 90s. As such, 
unemployment was way above the OECD average combined with already low labour market 
participation rates (Neugart, 2005). Despite those developments, Germany was still not able to 
implement comprehensive labour market reforms. 
The high level of unemployment rates in Germany were the main concern throughout the whole 90s 
and half of the next decade. With steadily increasing unemployment rates, the costs for 
unemployment benefits exploded. The expenditures of the Federal Employment Agency nearly 
doubled from 25 billion euros to roughly 45 billion euros (BA 1992a-2004a). Facing increasing 
unemployment rates and mounting costs in unemployment benefits, Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
wanted to begin with extensive reforms and for that he started the Alliance for Jobs (Bündnis für 
Arbeit). The Alliance for Jobs, however, failed in reaching any consensus because none of the three 
parties participating were “willing to make the first sacrifice’’ (Stephen, 1999: 86).  
By now, it should be sufficiently clear that the need for a welfare state reform, particularly of the 
labour market, was urgent. Therefore the question remains, why Germany, unlike the Netherlands 
and Denmark, amongst others such as Sweden (Pierson, 1996; Topel et al., 2010), Great Britain 
(Pierson, 1996) and Finland (Uusitalo, 1996), was unable to reform the German welfare state until 
the second term of Gerhard Schröder? This becomes especially puzzling when it is taken into 
consideration that these “three countries [Denmark, Netherlands and Germany are] similar in 
political culture, history and institutional form’’ (Cox, 2001: 463). The solution offered by Cox 
(2001) is called path-shaping and traces back to the concept of Jacob Torfing (1999). Cox is 
showing convincingly that Denmark and the Netherlands were able to transform their welfare state 
because they were able to shape a path on which reform became necessary, while Germany did not 
manage to enforce a new set of ideas (2001).  
The research goal of the present thesis is to assess whether the labour market reforms in Germany 
can be explained by the means of DI and a turn to ideas in general. According to Schmidt, DI can 
provide answers to the questions why and how institutional change occurs (2008a, 2008b). Not only 
Schmidt, but a growing number of scholars are convinced that Discursive institutionalism, often 
combined with tools of agenda setting and critical juncture and the school of historical 
institutionalism, can significantly enrich the analysis of politics, and policy change in particular 
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(Béland, 2005; Starke, 2006). Later in this study´s theoretical framework, DI will be explained in 
greater length and it will be compared to other relevant theories.  
 1.2 Research Question 
This study has multiple objectives in order to give a comprehensive answer to the puzzle of the 
German labour market reforms from 2003-2005, known as the ‘Hartz’ reforms. Starting point is that 
with the help of the ideational literature in political science, the emergence of the ‘Hartz’ reforms 
can be sufficiently explained. It is not to expected that ideational literature alone can explain the 
emergence of the reforms, though it can be expected that the turn to ideas will enrich the analysis 
significantly. The case of the reforms in the German labour market represents an interesting case 
because most theories cannot provide a coherent explanation of the emergence of the reform. They 
are at best patchwork when considering a comprehensive approach of the reforms (Neugart, 2005). 
The first objective of this study is to provide a sound analysis with the help of DI and through 
employing an ideational power debate. 
The labour market reforms are often perceived as a paradigm shift (Oschimanski et al., 2007) as 
provided in the seminal work by Peter Hall (1993). This study disagrees with the ideational 
literature concerning the perception of the ‘Hartz’ reforms. The newly emerged concept of an intra-
paradigm shift (Carstensen and Matthijs, forthcoming) appears to be more suiting for the present 
case of German labour market reforms from 2003-2005. Hence, the second objective of this study 
results in a careful analysis of the reforms from the perspective of a paradigm shift.  
The two research questions and their hypotheses can therefore be stated as the following: 
I. Can the emergence of the ‘Hartz’ reforms be explained by the means of an ideational power 
 debate and the tools provided by DI? 
 H1: We expect more use of power through ideas in the case of structural reform than in the 
 case that did not lead to structural reform. 
II. Do the labour market reforms in Germany pose a paradigm shift after Hall or do the labour 
 market reforms in Germany constitute an intra-paradigm shift? 
 H1: We expect no or only a few third order changes in the analysis of the reforms of the  
 German labour market. 
Even though the first question is the main concern of this study, the latter question needs to be 
addressed first. Different theories apply when there is a third order change and therefore a paradigm 
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shift in politics compared to when there are significant structural reforms but within the same 
paradigm. A third order change usually goes along with a complete exchange of ideas about a 
certain topic, for instance labour market reforms. An intra-paradigm shift, on the contrary, usually 
just includes a few new ideas to the debate or weighs existing ideas and sub-goals differently, but 
does not exchange the ideational core at heart of a policy problem. It is important to note that the 
main goal of this thesis is to find a causality between ideational power and structural reform, 
however the second question is not concerned with issues of causality. The question is of a purely 
descriptive nature and its main goal is to reach an accurate classification of the implemented 
reforms. 
 1.3 Scientific Relevance 
To trace policy change is a difficult task. An easier way, as scholars pointed out, to measure for 
instance the politics of retrenchment in quantitative terms, can often be deficient (Pierson, 1996; 
Cox, 2001). Turning to ideational literature, which is subtle and symbolic (van Dijk, 2000), can help 
to shed light on the process which underlies policy change. Scholars such as Pierson and Immergut 
contributed greatly to institutional research, but they are inadequate when it comes to explaining 
change because they promote equilibrium models as Clemens and Cook pointed out (1999). The 
advantage of DI over the other three branches of institutionalism (Historical, Rational Choice and 
Sociological Institutionalism) is that it brings agency into the picture: “Discourse is not just ideas or 
‘text’ (what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was said). The term refers not 
only to structure (what is said, or where and how) but also to agency (who said what to 
whom).’’ (Schmidt, 2008b: 305). 
However, tracing an idea is not easy to achieve. Looking at the state of the art literature on DI and 
ideas, a structured approach in tracing ideas is hard to find. Sabina Stiller in her dissertation 
provides a sound framework that shows which role this ideational leadership played in the German 
welfare state reforms under Gerhard Schröder (Stiller, 2007). Usually, change is explained by 
showing that other explanations fail and only ideational explanations as a residual remain. This 
thesis aims to provide a sound framework in tracing an idea and evaluate its role in the significant 
structural change during the labour market reforms in Germany. It aims to do so by making use of 
process-tracing and analysing ideational elements and other forms of stylistic figures. 
Not only through providing a meticulously applied process-tracing method this study discerns itself 
from similar studies in the field of ideational scholarship, but also by not taking big macroeconomic 
ideas into observation (Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2006; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013; Carstensen and 
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Matthijs, forthcoming) but specific structural reforms in social policy. Here, labour market reforms 
are analysed, which certainly are partly based in macroeconomic ideas, but not exclusively. 
To understand policies and policy change as socially constructed, and therefore turning to ideas, is a 
rather new approach. It is hard to point at a certain year in which ideas have been rediscovered by 
scholars of institutions and the ideational turn has been consummated, but they range from the 
1990s until now (Béland, 2005; Béland and Cox, 2011; Hogan and Timoney, 2017; Parsons, 2007; 
Schmidt, 2002; Torfing, 1999). They are often explicitly (Hogan and Timoney, 2017; Schmidt, 
2002; Torfing, 1999) linked to the concept of critical juncture and sometimes more implicitly by 
making use of historical institutionalism (Béland, 2005). A more extensive literature review will be 
provided in the theoretical framework of this study. 
Neugart tried to find reasons of the emergence of the labour market reforms in Germany 2003-2005 
and while he has shown successfully that other approaches have serious shortcomings, his 
conclusion was rather dry and he is also not providing a framework in which he places his analysis 
(2005). This thesis aims to fill this research gap and provide a sound framework to analyse policy 
change by tracing an idea and how it is conveyed on the example of the German labour market 
reforms in 2003-2005.  
 1.4 Societal Relevance 
In a representative democracy understanding the policy process is crucial. The relevance of such an 
endeavour is self-evident. Having a deeper understanding of the policy process is beneficial for not 
only the scholars who are invested in researching a certain topic but also for the general public. 
Citizens, that do not understand the policy process and are not informed about it, have higher risks 
of being the victims of manipulation and in that regard, populists hold more power in influencing 
the general public. But interest groups would also benefit from a better understanding of the policy 
process, here addressed in particular are trade unions, political consultants and other stake holders. 
Some confusion might be caused by the broadness of the impact of politics, but that is exactly why 
a comprehensive understanding of the policy process is necessary. It might be surprising that this 
study chose to exercise the tracing of ideas on the example of the ‘Hartz’ reforms in Germany since 
they are now older than ten years. However, they never forfeited any topicality in Germany. 
Especially Martin Schulz, the new candidate of the Social Democrats running for chancellor, puts 
the reforms on the agenda of his election campaign. By the time this study is written, he hasn't 
specified much of which part of the so called ‘Agenda 2010’ he tries to turn back, except an 
increase in the length of unemployment benefits. Furthermore did Germany develop from the “sick 
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man of the euro” (Economist, 1999) towards an economy that is considered the ‘poster child’ of 
economic success. Understanding how such comprehensive reforms could have been undertaken 
after years of reform deadlock is of relevance for a society. 
 1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis will continue with an extensive discussion of the state of the art literature. DI will be 
discussed and distinguished from HI, RI and SI. Subsequently, the ideational power debate will be 
depicted in detail. At first, ideational power will be distinguished from conventional power 
definitions and afterwards, delicate distinctions of ideational power types will be elucidated. The 
theoretical chapter continues with a discussion of paradigm shift vs. intra-paradigm shift embedded 
in a very brief discussion about the nature of scientific progress. It will conclude with a short 
explanation of what is meant by the term of ordoliberalism. All theories that have been mentioned 
above, will be explained in greater length in the theoretical framework. 
The study will proceed with a delineation of the methodology chosen. This chapter is driven by 
questions about the nature of this study, for instance, why a case study has been chosen, what are 
the advantages and disadvantages of process tracing and how they apply to the problem at hand. It 
will also be elaborated on the operationalisation of the variables and how evidence is gathered. 
The fourth and the fifth chapter are the most important chapters in this study. The fourth chapter 
analyses the labour market reforms of both Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder. Here, the second 
research question outlined in the introduction will be answered. Before the question is answered, a 
more in-depth introduction of the German labour market will be provided. Figures concerning GDP 
growth, employment and unemployment and worker productivity will be addressed for both, 
Eastern and Western Germany. Afterwards this study strives to analyse whether or not the ‘Hartz’ 
reforms pose a third order change and therefore a paradigm shift. In order to do so, the most 
important labour market reforms by Helmut Kohl will be looked at, as well as the reforms by the 
Schröder cabinet´s 1998-2005. The reforms will examine whether new instruments, new goals or a 
new ideational belief have been introduced with them. 
As mentioned above, the fourth and the fifth chapter are at the heart of this study. In the second 
part, it will be analysed how ideas are conveyed by looking at parliamentary debates of the two 
most important reforms by Kohl and Schröder, the ‘AFRG’ in 1997 and the ‘Hartz’ laws in 2005. 
Besides parliamentary debates, the ideational background will be established by looking at election 
campaigns, government declarations and basic programmes. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
In this theoretical framework relevant theories, from which this study draws upon, are sketched out 
to develop the argumentation. This framework starts with DI and briefly discusses how it differs 
from the other new institutionalisms. It will continue introducing power into the debate about ideas 
and conclude with paradigm shifts, shifts within paradigm and, in particular, the ordoliberal 
paradigm will be depicted.  
The theories that are important to this study are concerned with institutions and ideas, thus it is 
helpful to define what institutions and ideas are, before we dig deeper into specific theories. 
Broadly speaking, an institution can be described as a pattern of behaviour amongst a set of actors. 
In some cases, enduring patterns create formal organisations, such as the military or universities. 
However, in other cases these patterns simply manifest themselves in rules (Parsons, 2007). The 
perhaps most prominent definition of institutions comes from North, who defines institutions as 
“any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction” as well as 
“regularities in repetitive interactions… customs and rules that provide a set of incentives and 
disincentives for individuals” (North, 1986, 1990: 4; cited in Parsons, 2007: 69). Parsons further 
argues that institutionalists argue “that the setting-up of certain intersubjectively present institutions 
channels people unintentionally in certain directions at some later point” (Parsons, 2007: 67). 
Ideational explanations are becoming more and more popular. Since the 1990s, ideational 
explanations are a regular feature of political science (Stone, 1989; Hall, 1989, 1993; Berman, 
1998). Its inherent logic is straight forward, because “[i]t explains actions as a result of people 
interpreting their world through certain ideational elements” (Parsons, 2007: 96). Parsons correctly 
criticises that not everything can be explained purely by ideational elements. He sees a necessary 
turn towards logic and rationality (2007). This criticism is a good starting point to sketch out the 
theoretical body of DI because Schmidt picks up that criticism and uses it for her own argument 
(2006). 
 2.1 Discursive Institutionalism 
The story of ideas started in the late 80s and with Deborah Stones ‘Causal stories and the formation 
of policy agendas’ (1989), followed by Peter Hall (1989, 1993), Berman (1998), McNamara (1999), 
Cox (2001), Blyth (2002), Schmidt (2002, 2006, 2008), and Béland and Cox (2011) and Blyth 
(2002) to just name a few scholars that “took pains to demonstrate and theorize that indeed ideas do 
matter” (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). The term DI is of “recent vintage” (Schmidt, 2008b) even 
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though the term has been used by other scholars such as Campbell and Pedersen (2001). Hay (2001) 
refers to a similar set of ideas but called it ideational institutionalism. 
DI also is based in ideas and can be defined as the following: “Discursive institutionalism focuses 
on the substantive content of ideas and on the interactive processes that serve to generate those 
ideas and communicate them to the public (Schmidt, 2008a). Schmidt also states that scholars of DI 
have four things in common. a) Discourse and ideas are taken seriously b) ideas and discourse are 
put into institutional context c) ideas are put into a ‘meaning context’ and discourse follows a ‘logic 
of communication’ d) change is looked at dynamically and ideas and discourse have the power to 
overcome institutional obstacles (2008b). It is important to note that discourse is not to be 
understood in the context of post structuralists such as Derrida whose standpoint was that discourse 
is interpretation of text without context (Schmidt, 2008b). However, Panizza and Miorelli point out 
that this view is a misinterpretation of post structuralists discourse theory. PSDT does not reject 
reality and facts external to ourselves, but those facts can only be made sense of when put into 
contexts, such as discourse (2012). In fact, DI would agree with that interpretation of PSDT and 
tries to achieve the same thing because DI tries to analyse not only what is said, but also where, 
when, how and why something was said (Schmidt, 2008b). She further distinguishes between 
coordinative discourse amongst policy actors such as bargaining, reaching agreements and arguing 
and communicative discourse between actors from the political sphere towards the public (Schmidt, 
2008a). In compound polities such as Germany, it is argued that the coordinative discourse is more 
important than the communicative discourse (Schmidt, 2008b). However, Béland says that she 
probably understates the role of communicative discourse in such countries (Béland, 2005). At the 
very heart of discourse and DI are ideas and ideas appear as either cognitive or normative ideas. 
“[C]ognitive ideas elucidate what is and what to do, whereas normative ideas indicate what is good 
or bad about what is” (Schmidt, 2008b: 306). Ideas, of course, need to be defended and established 
in discourse and Schmidt also distinguishes between two forms of arguments that can be made. For 
a cognitive argument to be convincing, it firstly needs to define the problem that wants to be solved 
by the polity (Schmidt, 2006), subsequently the policy programme has to prove that it is relevant, 
that the policy programme is applicable and in its norms, concepts, methods and instruments 
coherent (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). Normative arguments “appeal to the norms and 
principles of public life” and not so much to the effectiveness of an idea. Their success is dependent 
on showing how appropriate the idea is compared to the norms and values within the polity 
(Schmidt, 2002: 213 cited in Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016).  
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In sum, the discourse part of DI consists of two types of ideas, cognitive and normative, which are 
the substantive content of discourse. Discourse is conveyed either in a communicative or 
coordinative discourse. 
But we also need to shed light on the institutional part of DI. DI treats institutions at the same time 
as external and internal. Institutions are on the one hand the context in which agents move and on 
the other hand they are internal to actors, meaning they are both constraints to actors and constructs 
in which those actors can change institutions (Schmidt, 2008b). Schmidt explains further that 
sentient agents have background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities. The 
concept of background ideational abilities draws from the concept of background abilities voiced by 
Searle (1995). Background abilities are internal to agents which allow them to talk within 
institutions without the following of external rules (Schmidt, 2008b). Background ideational 
abilities describe the “ideational process by which agents maintain and create 
institutions” (Schmidt, 2008b: 315). Actors are, in contrast to background ideational abilities, aware 
of foreground discursive abilities. “Foreground discursive abilities enable people to reason, debate, 
and change the structures they use” (Schmidt, 2008b: 316). Both combined bring agency back into 
the analysis of institutions and they also constitute the single biggest advantage of DI over RI, SI 
and HI. With allowing actors to not only maintain and follow the rules of institutions, but in fact 
allowing them to change institutions, DI gets more dynamic than RI, SI and HI.  
To sharpen the understanding of DI, it will be briefly distinguished from SI, RI and HI. SI is the 
closest to DI because both are ideational approaches (Parsons, 2007). Of particular interests to 
scholars of SI are institutions which can be described as a “rule like status in social thought and 
action (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991:9). SI emphasises on the role of culture, that scripts and rules, 
that are taken for granted, determine institutions. Institutions are the result of a process of norms 
and values getting internalised by actors that leads to an equilibrium based theory (Parsons, 2007).  
Rational Choice Institutionalism creates outcomes according to fixed preferences of outcomes 
(Schmidt, 2008). The common assumption that preferences are stable (Varian, 2010: 118) will lead 
to an equilibrium without room for agency. Institutions only change when preferences change, thus 
making RI an equilibrium based theory as well. 
Historical Institutionalism is perhaps the most prominent branch of the four new institutionalisms. It 
consists of two main concepts. The first one is path dependence and the second one is unintended 
consequences. The main notion of HI is that “history matters” (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). It 
!9
explains policy outcome on the basis of decisions made and paths entered in the past. While it can 
explain how change happened, through for instance layering and drift (Thelen and Streeck, 2005), it 
has problems to explain why change happens. HI, such as RI and SI, does not promote agency and 
therefore has difficulties to explain change sufficiently. DI on the other hand allows for agency and 
has therefore a unique toolset to analyse policy change in all its facets. 
 2.2.1 Concepts of Power 
Schmidt´s framework was also exposed to substantial criticism. Her conception of the relation of 
discourse and ideas is seen as too limited by Panizza and Miorelli (2012). They state that discourse 
is never neutral, nor does the merging of discourse and ideational elements necessarily follow 
logical rules (Panizza and Miorelli, 2012). Instead, discourse delineates power struggles and sets the 
framework of what is sayable and thinkable within a given social order, and in the case which is 
analysed here, a polity (Laclau, 1980 cited in Panniza and Miorelli, 2012). As Blyth mentions, 
power is a very important concept in political sciences (2016). And the concept of power found its 
way into the work of ideational scholars. Most prominently found by Carstensen and Schmidt 
(2016) but also Widmaier introduces power into ideational scholarship (2016). The conception of 
power has taken many forms in the professional literature. Power is understood as compulsory, as 
found by Weber (1947) or Dahl (1957: 202-3) who gave the classic definition of power when “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. 
Another approach to power is seeing it as structural. It means “the constitution of subjects’ 
capacities in direct structural relation to one another” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 43). This approach 
has probably been most clearly exercised by Marxists, whose concept of class structure creates 
different social capacities and interests depending on the classes (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). A third 
and last conception of power before we turn to ideational power is institutional power. Institutional 
power is the control actors exercise indirectly over others “through diffuse relations over 
others” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 43). This conception of institutional power played an important 
role for scholars of HI (Immergut, 1990; Pierson, 2004). These three concepts, can be seen as the 
traditional concepts of power. 
  
 2.2.2 Ideational Power 
Scholars often write about the power of ideas without theorising the power part (Carstensen and 
Schmidt, 2016) but only “fleshing” out the ideational part (Blyth, 2016: 464). Nonetheless, 
Carstensen and Schmidt, in their recent contribution, illuminate the power part. In the following this 
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study will depict the ideational power theory complex in greater detail while subsequently mention 
the possible pitfalls of that theory. 
They define ideational power as “the capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to 
influence actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational 
elements” (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 320). Ideational elements can be multiple things, such as 
discourse, practices, myths, narratives and symbols. Ideational power has three distinguishing 
properties compared to the conventional approaches to power. Power is exerted by agents through 
the constitution of meaning structures. These meaning structures are not objective but 
intersubjective, which in its weakest meaning connotes as agreement. In the PSDT tradition it could 
be said that actors put a problem in the same meaning context. Both actors engaged with each other 
draw from these structures to explain their material and social circumstances. To decide which idea 
is “deemed viable” (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 322) is what they are struggling about with 
each other.  
While usually only elites are privileged making use of power, ideational power does recognise the 
bottom-up process. Bottom-up means that also policy actors coming from the basis are able to 
convey their ideas to the general public through language or ideational elements that are easily 
understandable and accessible. Consequently, a top-down approach means that policy elites from 
the top ‘dictating’ their ideas to the basis and general public (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). 
Relevant in our case is most likely the top-down approach based on how trade union leader Michael 
Sommer described the governing style of Gerhard Schröder with a motto from the bible Job 1:21: 
“The LORD gave, and the LORD has taken away” (Sommer, 2014).  
The approach outlined by Carstensen and Schmidt also conceptualises ideational power, in line with 
DI, in agency oriented terms (2016). However, it is also mentioned that more structural 
explanations of institutional understanding are more suiting to analyse “the role of ideas in exerting 
political power” (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 322). Also, ideational structures are not 
immutable, they are constantly formed by actors making unconscious use of them. On a first glance, 
DI and ideational power tradition work in harmony with each other, while in fact, accepting this 
would macerate the DI framework. As stated above, actors within institutions, here being structures, 
have background ideational abilities, which they are unconscious of, and foreground discursive 
abilities, which can be used not only to create or maintain but change institutions (Schmidt, 2008b). 
According to the ideational power tradition, the unconscious use of structure by actors constantly 
evolves same structures. Combined with the DI framework, both conscious and unconscious action 
shape institutions. Such convertible institutions seem to leave little room for sound causal inference 
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because they are undergoing constant change. The notion of actors unconsciously influencing 
structures will be rejected in this study, in favour of institutional explanations. However, the notion 
of agency and influencing others through the use of ideational elements within institutions, either in 
a communicative or coordinative discourse, appears to be of great use for the analysis of policy 
change. 
 2.2.3 Power through Ideas 
Carstensen and Schmidt continue to distinguish three types of ideational power. The one most 
commonly associated with policy change is power through ideas. Power over ideas is the power to 
prevent certain ideas from entering the discourse. Connected to the power debate above, this type of 
power is comparable with compulsory power. The third type is power in ideas and is concerned 
with ideas that are unconsciously accepted and constitute a paradigm that controls the discourse 
over all other ideas (2016). In the following, the three types will be outlined with a focus on the first 
type, power through ideas, which will be discussed in greater detail while the others will be 
mentioned only briefly.  
Power through ideas is not a compulsory exertion of power but a persuasive exertion of power. 
Their persuasiveness depends on the quality of cognitive and normative arguments made in favour 
of an idea. Both types of arguments have already been discussed above, but because of their 
relevance for the use of ideational power, we can discuss them a bit further here. Only one thing 
will be added concerning cognitive arguments. The claim of coherence for a cognitive argument 
sometimes benefits from vagueness. It leaves room for interpretation for all the parties involved and 
therefore parties can more easily agree on an idea because it can be interpreted in their favour 
(Schmidt, 2006). Neoliberalism can be seen as such an idea because it is a very wide term. It is 
mutable and very adaptable (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013). Normative arguments depend on their 
appropriateness. Cognitive arguments that are based on scientific reasoning are often more powerful 
when a logic of appropriateness is added to the cognitive argument embedded in a logic of 
consequence (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke point out that often 
the success of persuasion is dependent on the “broad mass intuition” (2007: 755). If the policy 
beliefs of the mass public diverge with the beliefs shared by elites, a “legitimacy gap” can occur 
(Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007: 755).  
The orientation towards agency outlined by Carstensen and Schmidt sees ideas not as something 
that is “contained” in their minds but it can be used as a resource. It is emphasised that an actor can 
hold an idea and “stand outside and critically engage” others with such an idea (2016: 325). 
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Ideational power here is not to confuse with manipulation, but to be understood as an act of 
persuasion. When ideational power is exerted through ideas, it is important again to distinguish 
between a coordinative discourse in the policy sphere and a communicative discourse in the 
political sphere. In times of structural change, such as in the case of the ‘Hartz’ reforms, actors need 
to be able to challenge existing institutions with their ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). In the 
German case, this could be the old Federal Agency for Jobs, which was renamed and restructured 
during the reforms or the role of trade unions in the policy process. Power through ideas can be at 
play in both times of radical change and during times of evolutionary change (Carstensen and 
Schmidt, 2016). 
 2.2.4 Power over Ideas 
“[Power over ideas]… is the capacity of actors to control and dominate the meaning of 
ideas” (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 326). There are three types of power over ideas. The first 
type allows actors to impose their ideas on others because they are in control of the traditional types 
of power and therefore they can protect their ideas from being challenged. The second type is the 
case when actors are not holding any traditional forms of power. However, they are able to pressure 
other actors into behaving in a way they otherwise would not do, through the means of discourse. 
This phrasing shows that this concept is more related to compulsory power, since the other actor is 
not persuaded into a new belief, but pressured. Usually actors need to employ a strong 
communicative discourse to achieve that and examples are often bottom-up processes. The third 
type of power over ideas allows actors to resist and ignore competing ideas. This type normally 
comes along with actors in quite powerful positions (in the traditional sense). 
  
 2.2.5 Power in Ideas 
“[P]ower in ideas concerns the deeper level ideational and institutional structures that actors draw 
upon and relate their ideas to in order for them to gain recognition among elites and in the mass 
public” (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 329). Power in ideas are about ideas that are so deeply 
rooted in individuals that they stop being aware of them. They have the authority to structure 
thoughts and are about “background ideational processes” (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 329). 
This framework of ideational power sketched out by Carstensen and Schmidt draws heavily upon 
Foucault. but here they distinguish power in ideas from Foucault’s “archaeology” of a discursive 
formation (2000). 
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 2.3.1 Paradigms  
After having discussed the means through which policy change happens, in broad terms through 
ideas and sentient agents exerting power, it is time to turn towards what kinds of changes there are. 
A rich framework provided by Peter Hall in his seminal work introducing policy paradigms into the 
research domain of public policy (1993). His work is based on the work of Kuhn and his book The 
structure of scientific revolutions (1970). Building on Kuhn, Hall finds three kinds of changes in 
policy making which he calls first, second and third order changes (Hall, 1993). The concept of a 
first order change applies when basic instruments are altered in size, but overall the goals and 
instruments remain the same. A second order change applies when the overall goals remain the 
same but new instruments get introduced. Those two forms of policymaking are called “normal 
policymaking” (Hall, 1993: 279). The third order change is the most radical form of change in his 
framework. It applies when all three kinds of changes apply at the same time. Such an event is of 
rare occurrence, but if found, it constitutes a paradigm shift (Hall, 1993). Hall borrows three 
building blocks for his theory. The first is, the differentiation between “normal science” and 
paradigm shifts, which is discussed above in the first, second and third order changes. The second is 
the importance of anomalies. “[Anomalies are] developments that are not fully comprehensible, 
even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm” (Hall, 1993: 280). If a paradigm encounters such 
developments, proponents of the paradigm usually extend the borders and incorporate those 
anomalies into the framework of the paradigm. However, this undermines the coherence of the 
paradigm and leads eventually to a weakened paradigm (Hall, 1993). Finally, he builds on the 
incommensurability thesis, meaning that paradigms exist exclusively and cannot coexist. Though, 
the incommensurability thesis was also rejected in the scientific discussion with Lakatos and his 
work The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (1978). Similar criticism can be found 
about Halls framework. With paradigms existing only exclusively, Hall took a hard stance on the 
coherence and inherent logic of paradigms (Carstensen and Matthijs, forthcoming). Criticised as 
well has been the emphasis of punctuated equilibrium in Hall´s work. Oliver and Pemberton show 
that new ideas are incorporated rather gradually instead of one big exchange of ideas (2004). Recent 
scholarship has now turned towards a model of “punctuated evolution” to observe ideational change 
that happens within a paradigm (Carstensen and Matthijs, forthcoming: 5).  
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 2.3.2 Ideational Change within a Paradigm 
Intra-paradigm ideational change departs from the view that paradigms do depend on their 
coherence, but on the overall perception as coherent. If this perception is shared amongst enough 
other policy and societal elites, coalitions can be formed to reinforce the legitimacy of the paradigm 
and continue its institutionalisation (Carstensen and Matthijs, forthcoming). With a notion of 
paradigms based on “punctuated evolution” instead of punctuated equilibrium, new ideational 
elements can be added to the existing paradigm. This flexibility of policy paradigms, compared 
with the rather rigid scientific Kuhnian paradigms, is necessary because political contexts are in 
constant flux (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). Furthermore, a fourth category is added to Hall´s 
framework of paradigm shifts. While Hall promotes a framework in which the setting of 
instruments and goals that are coherent with another constitute a paradigm (1993), Carstensen and 
Matthijs add sub-goals to the analysis, which allows even greater flexibility (forthcoming). While 
competing parties can pursue different sub-goals, the overall ‘greater’ goal is not questioned. If 
there is a change in governmental power, the shift observed, if successfully translated into policies, 
is not radical but gradual. The new government wielding governmental power and usually having 
access to the most institutional power, can incorporate new ideas into the existing paradigm and 
weigh goals differently. Ideas that are not yet part of the dominating paradigm but are held by a 
party cause an ideational gap. Every party tries to close this ideational gap and incorporate their 
ideas into the paradigm. Ideas outside the paradigm can belong to a competing paradigm or no 
paradigm at all (Carstensen and Matthijs, forthcoming). While the existing paradigm as a whole 
remains untouched, significant consequences for agenda setting might apply. This effect becomes 
even more substantial when policy outcomes differ (Carstensen and Matthijs, forthcoming). The 
famous statement from Lowi “policies determine politics” (1972: 299) still applies and also does, 
even though not as rigid as in HI, institutional stickiness. 
 2.4 Ordoliberalism 
Finally, a brief theoretical discussion about ordoliberalism will be provided because it is the single 
most important paradigm in this thesis and the reader will come across ordoliberalism multiple 
times. Ordoliberalism originates from Germany and is associated with the economist Eucken and 
the two lawyers Böhm and Grossman-Doerth (Siems and Schnyder, 2013). The issue at heart, for 
ordoliberalism, is not to promote no state intervention. To the contrary, it is about promoting 
adequate state intervention. Adequate refers here to a state intervention that aims at functioning 
markets. The main reason for this positive role of the state is the fear that power differences would 
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lead to malfunctioning markets (Siems and Schnyder, 2013). The belief that individuals are free and 
encouraged to engage in markets is not to be confused with markets being free from government 
intervention (Siems and Schnyder, 2013). Naturally, markets are not seen as something 
spontaneously emerging but markets are to be created and fostered by the state through regulations 
and interventions in order to be well functioning (Siems and Schnyder, 2013). However, not all 
interventions are good interventions. With three fundamental market attributes, according to 
ordoliberals, is not to be tampered with. The first is the tendency of markets to reduce costs. The 
second being the tendency of markets to reduce profits in the long run and finally, the tendency of 
markets to increase profits in the short run (Siems and Schnyder, 2013). Interventions that are 
tolerated are either of regulatory or of “ordonnating” nature (Bilger, 1964, cited in Siems and 
Schnyder, 2013). Interventions of regulatory nature should be restricted to the price stability.  A 
second main concern of ordoliberals is to maintain competition in an economy. Ordoliberals are 
also stressing the fact that the economy is solely a small part of societal life. It needs to be in line 
with other parts of societal life, such as governmental and cultural order (Siems and Schnyder, 
2013). Thus, the social market economy in Germany with its emphasis on competition and social 
responsibility, which is often conjured by politicians, is based in the ordoliberal paradigm. 
  
 2.5 Summary 
This theoretical framework builds on three interrelated blocks and a discussion on ordoliberalism. 
The first one is DI and constitutes the outer frame of the analysis. It refers to this study´s emphasis 
on institutional explanations, but also places discourse and ideas into the centre of analysis. Its big 
advantage over the other forms of institutionalism is that it allows to make use of agency. Through 
agency, we are enabled to look at actors within an institutional setting and employ a power debate. 
Sentient agents are wielding ideational power, next to traditional forms of power, to achieve certain 
ideational goals. As our last building block, this study introduces paradigms. Paradigms are 
coherent, or at least perceived as coherent, sets of ideas that compete with each other. Within such 
sets of ideas, agents can make use of their power to incorporate their ideas and weights of sub-goals 
in the paradigm. The outcome of the struggle within a paradigm is what is objective of this study. 
Theories are formulated to pose a good description of reality. Therefore, after setting the theoretical 
frame for the analysis, expectations can be formed about how reality, as analysed in the documents 
and reforms below, will look like. In case that the ‘Hartz’ reforms constitute a paradigm shift, it can 
be expected to find first, second and third order changes all at once. In case of an intra-paradigm 
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shift, different observations are expected to be made. An emphasis on different sub-goals or a 
closing of the ideational gap is most likely to be observed.  
In terms of ideational power it is expected to find power through ideas more often compared to 
other types of power. Accordingly, narratives that promote change over continuity are to be 
expected when analysing policy change. 
3 Methodology 
When a researcher chooses a research design for her study, she needs to make a few conscious 
decisions. At the beginning, most certainly stands the questions whether a qualitative or a 
quantitative study is most suitable for the puzzle at hand. The next question should answer whether 
or not it is going to be a small-n or large-n study. According to the answers, a certain research 
design will be picked. A researcher needs to be aware that each research design has its limitations 
and benefits and it is the researcher’s task to choose a design that can apply its strengths to the case 
under scrutiny. This chapter is concerned with those questions. It provides an in-depth overview of 
the decisions that have been made to get a solid framework for the task at hand. 
 3.1 Case Study 
The following chapter is going to elaborate on the reasons why a case study research design has 
been chosen in this study. Firstly, the case study design is not undisputed. It is often defamed, yet it 
is in great use (Mahoney, 2000). Some advantages of case studies, particularly to this research, will 
be highlighted before we turn to limitations of case studies. Case study research allows us to make 
sense of unstructured phenomena (Bennet and Elman, 2007). Analysing context does not strike as a 
structured endeavour. But before turning closer towards this particular study, a few words are in 
place on how to define case studies. They can be defined as “an empirical enquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009: 14). Furthermore, 
Gerring distinguishes between an idiographic case study, which tries to explain one particular case, 
with little or no possible generalisation and more commonly observed within interpretivist 
approaches. The second type is a nomothetic case study. Its goals are quite contrary to the former, 
because it tries to achieve great generalisation to a large population and is associated with more 
positivist approaches (2006b). The present study can be associated with the interpretivist approach 
and is therefore an idiographic case study. It is important to note that case studies are not by 
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definition only applicable to qualitative designs, (Gerring, 2006a) but they often happen to be 
conducted in a qualitative manner. As we shall see below, the process-tracing method chosen also 
does not allow for much generalisation, rather it provides a single solution to a case and is therefore 
in harmony with the idiographic case study.  
As stressed multiple times in this study´s theoretical framework, the advantage of the theories 
chosen lies in the fact that they allow for agency. Logically, the study will have an actor-centred 
approach. It is about analysing speech patterns and discourse, which can be well analysed within 
sophisticated statistical analysis and a quantitative approach, yet in this particular case, where 
evidence is very unstructured and needs to be filled with meaning rather than being self-
explanatory, a quantitative approach would not allow for much causal inference. A qualitative 
approach appears more appropriate. 
In the research question stated above, I am interested in how ideational power is connected to 
structural reform. In more abstract terms causal relationships can be expressed as X causes Y. If 
there is a causal relationship, then X and Y need to be connected with each other by a causal 
mechanism. This causal mechanism is what I am interested in and they are best examined by a case 
study (Stiller, 2007).  
There is a third, a more practical reason, why a large-n design might not be feasible in this 
particular case with respect to the dependent variable: the limited amounts of cases there are of 
structural reforms, especially when restricted to only one country.  
Case studies, however, have been subjected to substantive criticism. Firstly, case studies lack the 
methodological rigour. Maoz criticises that a researcher interprets case studies as a form of free 
research without any methodological boundaries (2002). And even Yin agrees with the lack of 
systematic procedures (2009), however, researchers increasingly tend to outline their methods with 
more rigour (Bennet and Elman, 2010). A second concern raised is the subjectivity of researchers. 
Biased research is hard to replicate and therefore the causal inferences made in such research have 
to be questioned. This is a valid criticism as well, though quantitative measures, in comparison, 
often only appear to be objective. If the question is asked how data was produced, one gets 
confronted with the same bias as in a qualitative case study. Additionally, if intangibles are 
measured, interpretive means are necessary to make sense of such concepts (Berg and Lune, 2012). 
Hence, research designs can generally be flawed and are possibly biased, independent from the type 
of research, may it be quantitative or qualitative. Finally, case studies are often criticised for their 
weak external validity and generalisability (King and Keohane and Verba, 1994). While the claim 
itself appears to be a devastating verdict for case studies, the claim is mitigated when considering 
!18
that often generalisation is not the goal of case studies. As a matter of fact, the contrary is often the 
case. Beach and Pedersen write that certain types of process-tracing are not at all generalisable and 
aim only to provide an explanation to a particular puzzling outcome (2016).  
 
Even though there are limitations that need to be taken seriously, I am convinced that a case study is 
by far the most suitable research design to analyse the case at hand. Carefully chosen cases can 
ensure a relatively high validity and a rigour method can ensure an in-depth within case inference. 
 3.2 Methods 
The goal of this study is to provide a sound framework to analyse whether or not the use of 
ideational power bears enough explanatory power to explain the occurrence of the ‘Hartz’ reforms. 
The method chosen to achieve this task is process-tracing. There are three different types of 
process-tracing: (1) theory-testing process-tracing, (2) theory-building process-tracing and (3) 
explaining-outcome process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). This research is interested in a 
particular single outcome; hence the third type comes in handy for this analysis. Explaining-
outcome process-tracing aims to arrive at a sufficient explanation of a phenomenon that is able to 
explain all angles of a problem without unnecessary information (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). 
Beach and Pedersen also note that the notion of causal mechanisms in explaining-outcome process-
tracing differs from the other two. In explaining-outcome process-tracing, a multi-layered causal 
mechanism tailored for the specific case under scrutiny, that by virtue of its uniqueness, is necessary 
but not comparable with other cases (2016). The outcome this study wishes to explain is the 
emergence of the ‘Hartz’ reforms because of the reluctance of preceding governments to dare 
structural reforms in the labour market and how this was possible to be changed.  
 3.3 Operationalisation 
This study consists of two empirical parts. The first part figures out what kind of paradigm shift in 
Germany happened: a full-fledged paradigm shift such as it described by Hall (1993) or rather an 
intra-paradigm shift as suggested by Carstensen and Matthijs (forthcoming)? The second part is 
concerned with the question in which way those shifts in ideas are conveyed. 
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 3.3.1 Paradigm or Intra-Paradigm Shift? 
The operationalisation of the first part is straight forward and can essentially be copied from the 
theory outlined above. Reforms are subject of examination and will be classified according to first, 
second and third order changes. Additionally, the reforms will be classified into a paradigm. Here, 
three paradigms are under consideration. The first is the Keynesian paradigm, which is mostly 
concerned with demand side stimulation of an economy. The second is the neoliberal paradigm, 
which is more focused on a supply side stimulation of the economy, while the third one, the 
ordoliberal paradigm is a form that emphasises on both the economy and their advantageous 
inherent market mechanisms and the social securities a state has to provide. There is no causality at 
play here and hence there is no arrangement of dependent and independent variables. This empirical 
part is purely a matter of classification.  
 3.3.2 How Ideas are Conveyed 
The key concepts in this study are ideational power, which is explained above in great detail, and 
structural reform. When defining structural reform, we follow Stiller who notes that either of the 
following three things must be present: 1) the financing structure, which states how for a social 
policy programme is financed. For instance, a programme used to be financed by fixed 
contributions by employees and now the system switches to a mode of general taxation. 2) the 
benefit structure can consist of means-tested, flat rate, earnings related, or contribution-related 
benefit or 3) the management or regulatory structure, describes who has a vote in the decision-
making process. If actors that were not usually included into the decision-making process, but now 
are, the regulatory structure changes (2007: 10). 
Ideational power is operationalised in the analysis of speech patterns, use of rhetorical language and 
ideational elements. Ideational elements can occur in the form of narratives, myths, symbols, 
practices and discourse. While the operationalisation of a structural reform is clear and enables the 
researcher to simply tick boxes, the operationalisation of ideational elements is somewhat trickier. 
The unit of analysis is going to be documents that contain speeches of parliamentary debates as well 
as election campaign programmes and basic programmes. Ideational elements cover a wide 
spectrum of things and differ from cultural context to cultural context. Especially Germany, because 
of its (in some parts) tragic history, has some unique connotations and constructions of meaning in 
the cultural context. Therefore, the analysis aims to figure out whether arguments are cognitive or 
normative, how stylistic characteristics and narratives are utilised and what they intend to achieve. 
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This part of the analysis is highly interpretative and therefore the possibly most erroneous part of 
this study.  
Two reforms are chosen which, in one case lead to a structural reform according to the definition 
provided above, while the other does not. Additionally, the cases are selected across two Cabinets 
with two different chancellors and ministers in charge of, in our case, social policy to warrant 
different policy styles (Stiller, 2007). 
 3.4.1 Data Collected 
The focus of the analysis lies on one particular reform of each government. The ‘AFRG’ reform 
implemented by the Kohl government will be looked at as well as the fourth ‘Hartz’ reform 
implemented by the Schröder government. However, to establish a timeline how ideas have 
developed and have been communicated, to establish the discourse governments used to convince 
and persuade others about their plans, more than just the debate surrounding the particular reforms 
need to be taken into consideration. That means a number of documents besides the respective 
debates are used to trace an idea and the ways it is communicated. In the case of the last Kohl 
cabinet, the analysis will start with the basic programme published in 1994 that posits the general 
position of the CDU. In particular it will be examined through which means CDU tries to achieve 
their goals and positions. Secondly, the election campaign programme of 1994 is examined as well 
as the government declaration after the won election in 1994. The declaration will especially focus 
on speeches delivered by Helmut Kohl and Norbert Blüm, who I both regard as key actors in the 
labour market reforms in Germany from 1994-1998. This evidence consists of official documents 
only and therefore it can be assumed it has high levels of reliability and validity. All documents 
combined provide a relatively comprehensive picture of the ideational conditions, the discourse 
established and ideational elements used by the Kohl government from 1994-1998.  
The analysis of the Schröder government will be of similar structure. Instead of a basic programme 
the Schröder-Blair Memorandum will be examined. Here, comparable to the basic programme of 
CDU, Schröder lays out goals, positions, challenges of social democratic policy making and means 
to achieve them and overcome the challenges ahead. The election campaign programme of 1998 
and 2002 are examined as well as the parliamentary debate about ‘Hartz 4’. The fourth and third 
‘Hartz’ law are at the heart of the analysis, though for the same reasons as stated above, a timeline, a 
process needs to be established to allow for sound causal inference. The official documents 
examined in the Schröder government follow a similar logic than the ones conducted from the Kohl 
era.  
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A few last concluding remarks why to terms of Schröder are taken into consideration, but yet, only 
one term of Kohl. The ‘Hartz’ laws are a result of the proposals of the Hartz Commission and the 
commission was instated in the end of the first term in 2002. With the ‘Hartz’ laws being part of the 
main body of the analysis it is reasonable to take Schröder´s first term into consideration as well 
even though the laws themselves have been implemented during the second cabinet. 
 3.4.2 How the Collected Data are Analysed 
After the operationalisation of the concepts it is important to describe how the data collection is 
structured. Two main things are examined in the analysis of how ideas are conveyed: power through 
ideas and power over ideas. The latter is associated with policy continuity and the former is 
associated with policy change. Power over ideas is often achieved through the shaming and 
discrediting of political opponents, whereas power through ideas shows more cooperative patterns. 
Power through ideas is also characterised by debates and arguments about the actual topic and not 
by opening up sideshows. How power through ideas and power over ideas are related to specific 
policy problems determines what part of the paradigm is emphasised by the respective actor.  
Besides that, narratives are of frequent use in debates. Those narratives either promote continuity, 
for instance Kohl in his government declaration from 1994, who praises the historical achievements 
of CDU but without reigniting the need for new structural reform. Such narratives qualify as power 
over ideas. Other narratives promote change over continuity, such as Schröder who spoke a lot 
about chances in his 1998 election campaign when he was confronted with challenges such as the 
EU or globalisation. He always connected the narrative about chances with the possibility to 
achieve better outcomes in the future, hence, he promoted change over continuity.  
The third aspect taken into consideration is whether it is a cognitive or a normative argument. Both 
kinds of arguments can be mustered for supporting either form of power. It can be compared 
though, if cognitive and normative arguments are combined for greater vigour. 
At the same times, the narratives and ideational elements are classified into the ordoliberal 
paradigm and how they differ from the political status quo. This is achieved by simply comparing 
reform proposals made in the analysed documents and the reforms in place at that time. 
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3.5 Validity and Reliability 
In this study, official documents are the only source of evidence. Official documents can expected 
to be accurate and, in this case of analysed parliamentary debates, I am confident that the 
documents are authentic and correct (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). Researchers digging into the same 
topic, will be able to find the same evidence and should thus be able to replicate the present 
research. However, relying on evidence from only one source always leaves room for measurement 
errors. Triangulated evidence always generates more securities and more confidence in the results 
found in a research project.  
A second point to consider is that this research is of highly interpretative and subjective nature. 
Discourse analysis is hardly free from individual interpretation (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 58) and the 
possibly biggest bias poses the researcher himself (Jørgensen and Merel, 2012). It is important to 
keep in mind that the present thesis does not strive for great generalisation. Therefore, being 
exposed to criticism of possibly being biased offers a chance as well as it posits a risk. The risk, 
naturally, is that the researchers bias distorts the findings. The chance is that the researcher can 
bridge the gap between a rigid operationalised concept and the wider meaning found in a contextual 
observation. 
A last thing to keep in mind is the limited size of cases taken into consideration and the small 
amount of empirical data. These limitations also do not allow for general causal inference, but only 
for causal inference within the cases looked at. This research only provides a single solution to one 
case in juxtaposition to another. If a researcher tried to apply the same method onto another case, in 
another cultural setting, he could come to different conclusions. 
4 The case of the German labour market reforms 2003-2005 - A Paradigm shift? 
The labour market reforms in Germany from 2003-2005 are better known as the ‘Hartz’ laws. In 
order to get a better understanding of the ‘Hartz’ laws, it first needs to be highlighted, why a 
structural reform was necessary. Hence, this chapter will provide the reader with basic figures 
concerning the German welfare state and the labour market in particular in the 90s. Subsequently, 
an overview of the reforms introduced with respect to the labour market under the two governments 
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(Kohl and Schröder) until 2005 will be developed. This chapter finally concludes with a first 
analysis and comparison of the instruments and goals of the implemented policies to shed light on 
the question whether the labour market reforms from 2003-2005 constituted a paradigm shift or an 
intra-paradigm shift. The starting point for the case description will be the German Unification in 
1990. For the single reason that the deterioration of the labour market accelerated from that moment 
on and should have forced the governments to act on the pressing matters.  
Prior to Unification, Western Germany had unemployment rates of 4,5% . However, after the 1
Unification, Germany was confronted with constantly increasing unemployment rates. On July 1. 
1990, the Deutsch Mark has been introduced in the former German Democratic Republic. All 
capital, labour and trade barriers have been removed and the tax, legal and social insurance systems 
have been harmonised (Wunsch, 2005). A fierce price-cost squeeze became apparent only a few 
days later (Akerlof, et al., 1991). Most products produced in the GDR were not competitive on the 
free market (BA, 2001), consequently the production dropped to 46% by December 1990 compared 
to the same month of the previous year (Akerlof, et al., 1991). This development resulted in a 
severe decline in the workforce by about 3 million people in the period of 1989-91 in the former 
GDR (BA, 2001). The unemployment rates would have been higher, but generous early retirement 
schemes have been offered, as well as participants of active employment policies were not counted 
as unemployed (Wunsch, 2005). However, this reduction of the workforce could not prevent that 
unemployment rose above 10% in 1991 in Eastern Germany from virtually no unemployment 
before Unification (BA, 1992a).  
Despite the global recession, Western Germany experienced a post-Unification boom with a GDP 
growth in 1990 and 1991 of 5,7% and 5% respectively. The period of boom was rather short an 
1993 GDP in Western Germany declined by 2,6%, unemployment rose to 8% simultaneously 
(Wunsch, 2005). Even though vast investments in the public infrastructure have been made, a boom 
in the construction industry happened and increasing private building activities and growth rates of 
6% to 9% were listed, the labour market situation in the former GDR continued to worsen.  
Wunsch states that the main reason is the gap between worker productivity and wages (2005). As 
seen in Table 1, 1991 the productivity of a worker from Eastern Germany amounts to about 33% of 
a worker from Western Germany. However, wages in Eastern Germany were collectively bargained 
starting from 1990 and already were at 57% of Western German wages (Wunsch, 2005). The rapid  
 German unemployment rates 1984-1992 (OECD) retrieved 23.3.2017 (varying numbers have been found in the Literature, see eg. Wunsch, 1
2005)
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wage parity was necessary to prevent migration from Eastern to Western Germany to not flood the 
already congested labour and housing market as well as to stop qualified labour migration from east 
to west (Czada, 1998; Franz and Steiner, 2000).  
In 1998, unemployment in Eastern Germany climbed up to more than 19%. The increase in 
unemployment was followed by a decline in GDP caused by a reduction in public expenditure and a 
decrease of the construction sector (Wunsch, 2005). From 1996 to 2000 Western German GDP 
growth increased from only 0.6% to 3% but growth directly started to decrease in the subsequent 
years. In 1997, unemployment already reached 11% in Germany, it decreased to roughly 8% in 
2000. In the same time the Eastern German economy was growing only at rates of 2% in 1999 but 
growth started to decrease in 2000. From 2001 the Eastern German economy was shrinking and 
unemployment rates remained at around 19% and in 2003 they breached the 20% mark. After the 
slowing down of the global economy, immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Centre 
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Table 1: Selected economic indicators for Germany 1990 - 2004
Year
 GDP growth* Unmployment rates** Productivity*** Gross wages****
West East West East East/West East/West
1990 5.7 -15.6 NA NA NA NA
1991 5. -19.2 6.2 10.2 32.9 57.5
1992 1.7 6.2 6.4 14.4 35.5 67.7
1993 -3.6 8.7 8. 15.4 39. 74.2
1994 1.4 8.1 9. 15.7 41.4 77.1
1995 1.4 3.5 9.1 14.8 42.5 79.1
1996 .6 1.6 9.9 16.6 43.4 79.5
1997 1.5 .5 10.8 19.1 44.6 79.8
1998 2.3 .2 10.3 19.2 66.9 80.1
1999 2.1 1.8 9.6 18.7 67.7 80.9
2000 3.1 1.3 8.4 18.5 68.5 81.3
2001 1.1 -.5 8. 18.8 69.1 81.2
2002 .2 -.2 8.5 19.2 69.9 81.2
2003 -.1 -.2 9.3 20.1 NA 81.2
2004 1.7 1.2 9.4 20.1 NA NA
Note:  All entries are in per cent
* GDP at constant 1995 prices. The number for 2004 are first perliminary estimates. 
** Registered unemployment as a percentage of the dependent civilian labour force. 
*** GDP per hour worked at 1995 prices. 
**** Gross wages per employee. NA: not available 
Source: Statitisches Bundesamt, BA (1992a-2004a), IAB (1998). 
on September 11, 2001, Western German unemployment rates were lying above 9% again (Wunsch, 
2005).  
To account for the cyclical component of unemployment it is helpful to look at long-term 
unemployment in Germany. In Eastern Germany 30.7% were accounted as long-term unemployed. 
The figures were almost constantly increasing except for a small period from 1995 to 1996 and in 
1999. In 2003 long-term unemployment in Eastern Germany amounted to 43.4% (BA, 1992b). 
There is a similar pattern in long-term unemployment in Western Germany. In 1991 long-term 
unemployment was reported at 28.3% and was decreasing for two subsequent years, followed by a 
sharp increase to 32.5% in 1994. From there on the figures were increasing with exception of 1996 
and 1997. There is a surprisingly drastic improvement in figures in 2001 of almost 5% with a 
further decrease of 2% to 30.0 in 2002. In the subsequent year long-term unemployment again rose 
to 32.3% (BA, 1992b).  
Different authors find arguments on both demand and supply side of labour for the increase in 
unemployment rates in Germany (Engbom et al., 2015). For instance, the high hiring and firing 
costs (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) on the demand side. On the supply side authors stress external 
shocks to economies as reasons for an increase in unemployment (Ljunqvist and Sargent, 1998). 
Another reason is the high unemployment benefits in Germany. While the short-term 
unemployment benefits were in line with the suggestions of the OECD, the long-term 
unemployment benefits were too generous and way above the OECD average (Engbom et al., 
2015). Workers need to accept a downward adjustment in wages, because often finding a new job is 
connected with accepting lower wages. To high unemployment benefits are considered an obstacle 
for that (Engbom et al., 2015; Jacobson et al., 1993). The high unemployment rates in Germany 
were already burdensome, but combined with high replacement rates (almost 60% of previous 
earnings when long-term unemployed) in unemployment benefits the German welfare state was 
facing a difficult challenge with mounting pressures.  
Most reasons found by the different authors appear to be solvable by only adjusting instruments, 
such as long-term unemployment benefits. This can be seen as a first hint, that a full-fledged 
paradigm shift is not necessary and that an intra-paradigm shift seems to be more appropriate.  
  
 4.1 Reforms under Government Kohl 
While towards the end it was characteristic for the government of Helmut Kohl to be associated 
with reform deadlock, there are, quantitatively speaking, rather many reforms and adjustments 
made over his era of 16 years. The government Kohl had two tools in mind for reforming the labour 
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market. One was the redistribution of labour and the other was a deregulation of the labour market 
(Jochem, 1999). The law to foster jobs (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) from 1985 made it easier 
to hire people, because it eased the rules for limited-terms contracts. Additionally, the introduced 
reform fostered part-time work, changed rules for employee assignments and redundancy packages. 
This reform was opposed by trade unions as well as by the Social Democrats. Both feared that 
employment rights were cut back (Jochem, 1999). This law is not particularly interesting for the 
following analysis, however it ignited the conflict between trade unions and the government what 
could play an important role when considering different possibilities in the emergence of the ‘Hartz’ 
reforms.  
The conflict between government and trade-unions lead to an Amendment of §116 AFG (Novelle 
des §116 AFG) which regulates the neutrality of the Federal Agency for Jobs (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit). It limits the influence that trade unions have in the labour market. Trade unions had the 
strategy to only strike at suppliers to cut off the supply for the processing industry. Through this 
strategy they had relatively low strike costs, but a much bigger impact on the labour market, 
because of the spill overs of other parts in the production chain (von Winter, 1989; Zohlnhöfer, 
1997). Workers at a later point in the supply chain were not able to work without the goods and 
services provided by companies prior in the supply chain. With the new AFG, however, workers 
laid off in the processing industry were not eligible for unemployment benefits, hence the strategy 
fell short. The relationship between government and trade unions can be described as very tense at 
the time, but the German constitutional court declared the amendment as lawful. The amendment 
must be seen as a compromise between the working wing of the Christian Democrats (the CDA) 
and the right-wing part of the Christian democrats. Despite this compromise, the confrontation 
between government and trade unions steered towards its peak in 1986 (von Winter, 1989). 
Furthermore, the trade unions weren't left incapacitated as the following years have shown, even 
though there has been a debate surrounding this issue (Armingeon, 1991). The financial situation of 
the Federal Agency for Jobs got noticeably better and the government tried to alleviate the conflict 
with the trade unions and the Social Democrats by expanding both the passive labour market 
policies and active employment policies, even though it was opposed by employer organisations. 
Employers plead for a lowering of contribution rates (Webber, 1987). 
The weak alliance formed in the negotiations of this amendment shattered when the First and 
Second Law to implement a Cut, Consolidation and Growth Programme in 1993 (Erste und Zweite 
Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Spar-, Konsolidierungs- und Wachstumsprogrammes) got introduced 
(Heinelt and Weck, 1998). It included that unemployment aid got bounded to one year and the 
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general replacement rates got visibly reduced. It generated a financial relief of 12,5 billion DM and 
therefore the biggest savings measure in the labour market (Blüm, 1998, cited from Jochem, 1999). 
Even though the law seems to be rather unspectacular, the reactions were strong. The government 
argued that because of the worse than expected growth of the German economy, the budget is too 
small to cover all the welfare assistance. Therefore, they shortened multiple instruments such as 
unemployment benefits, reintegration aid, reintegration benefits and others (BT-Drucksache, 
12/5929). Amongst others the law got heavily criticised by the trade unions, who argued that it 
creates a ‘soziale Schieflage’, the opposition consisting of Social Democrats and the Left party, 
stating that the law does not even deserve its own name because it only consolidates budgets on 
expense of the socially weak.  
In 1997, shortly before Helmut Kohl got voted out of office, the Christian Democratic government 
introduced a shift from the AFG to the social security statutes III (Sozialgesetzbuch III). SGB III 
brought multiple and incisive changes compared to the old AFG. If there were fixed claims for 
services in the AFG, the SGB III abolished all of them. Most decisions are now up to discretion 
except a handful situations, which are explicitly listed in the SGB III. However, the discretion is not 
concerned with the question to what extent services are provided but only with the question if 
services will be provided (Bieback, 1996/97). Also, the states right to interfere with special 
measures to different conditions than determined in the AFG increases in the new SGB III.  This is 
an interesting development, because the new SGB III leaves more room for the market with a 
neoliberal idea in mind but at the same time introduces more discretion for the state to intervene 
directly (Bieback, 1996/97). The SGB III also emphasises a stronger turn towards the support of 
specific groups rather than providing a basic support system. Targeted services rather than basic 
provision are the new credo. The first labour market (the first labour market is an employment 
contract without any benefits from the government) is supposed to be strengthened through the 
SGB III with the goal to match unemployed with the existing positions rather than creating 
subsidised position in the second labour market (Bieback, 1996/97). It is also determined in the new 
SGB III that the welfare assistance should be well below the lower wage groups. Long-term 
unemployed and other unemployed that are hard to match must bear the costs of the newly designed 
program to target those groups. The workplace law has been redesigned in a way that it now has a 6 
months’ probation time (prior to the SGB III it was 3 months) and in return the subsidies for wages 
payed to the employer have been reduced to 50% of the wage paid (Bieback, 1996/97).  
The Budget laws (Haushaltbegleitgesetze) marked the starting point of reforms in the era Kohl and 
emphasised on the insurance principle and shifted responsibilities towards the employees’ side. 
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Also, an early retirement reform got introduced to further decrease the workforce. Besides the 
above mentioned, three more labour market reforms should follow. The first one was the Growth 
and Employment Promotion Law (Wachstums- und Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) implemented 
in 1996 and already discussed above and in the same year the Reform for Unemployment Aid 
(Arbeitslosenhilfereform) followed. The Labour Promotion Law (Arbeitsförderungs-Reformgesetz) 
got implemented in 1997. Both reforms had in particular two things in common: costs were to cut in 
services, most prominently in active employment policies, and fürsorgerischer Arbeitsmarktpolitik 
(can be understood as the Federal Agency for Jobs helping unemployed to find labour for them) 
(Heinelt and Weck, 1998). Unemployed were put under more pressure to accept jobs offered by the 
Federal Agency for Jobs. The rules for appropriateness got lifted up so that unemployed had less 
possibilities to decline an offered job, even though the offered job had lower wages compared to 
their previous job (Jochem, 1999). Jochem further concludes that while in the first period till 
Unification the passive renumeration was targeted in reforms, the second episode until 1998 shifted 
that focus towards an active reintegration into the labour market (1999).  
In sum, the cabinet Kohl was often described with the metaphor of reform deadlock. In fact, it was 
so heavily discussed that the German association of German language once elected the word 
Reformstau as the word of the year. In quantitative terms and with respect to the labour market it 
can only be agreed on slightly. However, Cox correctly observed that the promised turnabout 
towards the market as the key institution for securing growth in the post golden age of the welfare 
states in qualitative terms did not happen (2001). Helmut Kohl, as Konrad Adenauer before him and 
Angela Merkel now, seem to root for continuity rather than for abrupt change. In the beginning his 
main tool to fight high unemployment rates was shrinking the workforce. This was of little success 
and as reasons for that immigration and women entering the labour market can be named (Jochem, 
1999). After the German Unification, the focus then slowly shifted towards reintegrate workers into 
the labour market. 
 4.2 Reforms under Cabinet Schröder 
The Social Democrats government in coalition with the Green party got elected in 1998 and got 
most recognition for the Laws for Modern Services in the Labour Market (Gesetze für moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt) or better known as the ‘Hartz’ laws. But little attention was paid 
to other policies implemented by the government before the first ‘Hartz’ law. However, this study 
spares the exact description of those policies but rather gives an overview of policies introduced and 
the main change they brought with them. Main focus in this chapter will lie on the ‘Hartz’ laws. The 
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newly elected government continues the course of consolidation and decreases the pension scheme 
contributions for people in unemployment assistance. This is in line with the consolidation strategy 
because the pension scheme contributions were paid by the Federal Agency for Jobs (today, there 
are still small pension schemes contributions paid by the Federal Agency for Jobs but only for 
people that are eligible for Unemployment Benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) (not to confuse with 
Arbeitslosengeld II which used to be jobseekers’ allowances but got abolished with the Hartz-
reforms) . In 1999 the original Unemployment Assistance (originäre Arbeitslosenhilfe) was 2
abolished. Unemployment assistance was granted to everybody that did not qualify for 
unemployment benefits, but worked for more than 150 days (Trube, 2002). As mentioned above, 
both laws were in line with the policies of the previous government. The Job-Active-Law  in 2001 
(Job-Aqtiv-Gesetz), which stands for activate, qualify, train, invest and match them, was a first step 
away from reactive employment promotion towards a more active and pre-emptive assistance of 
jobseekers’ (Mohr, 2004). Core of this new legislation is to strengthen support for longterm 
unemployed and a shift towards measures that get people back into the first labour market (Mohr, 
2004). Furthermore, job-seekers were from now on obliged to behave according to the so-called 
Integration Agreement (Eingliederungsvereinbarung) and if those rules written down in the 
integration agreement were transgressed, the Federal Agency for Jobs has the means to sanction the 
jobseeker (Trube, 2002).  
The large-scale reform of the labour market happened in the second term of the Social Democrats 
government. The first reform implemented contained a few structural changes. Employees had now 
the duty to report to the Federal Agency for Jobs shortly after or even before they became 
unemployed. Furthermore, young unemployed without a family are obligated to accept offered jobs 
by the Federal Agency for Jobs everywhere in Germany. In addition, the burden of proof, whether 
unemployment was self-inflicted or not was shifted towards the former employee (BT-Drucksache, 
15/0025). Another core issue has been the introduction of Personal-Service-Agencies (Personal-
Service-Agenturen) It got introduced as a new instrument to improve the matching quota of the 
Federal Agency for Jobs (Mohr, 2004; Stops, 2016). Workers can be ‘rented’ out in those PSA´s. 
Which unemployed qualify as ‘rentals’ gets decided in cooperation between the local PSA and the 
Federal Agency for Jobs (Mohr, 2004).  
The second ‘Hartz’ law promotes the idea of self-employment to fight unemployment with the so 
called ‘Ich-AG’. Diverse changes for small jobs got implemented to decrease illegal employment in 
 Information to the german pension scheme contributions paid by the Federal Agency for Jobs retrieved: 27.3.20172
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the black market (BT-Drucksache, 15/0026). Furthermore, the restructuring of ‘Job Centres’ are 
determined in the second ‘Hartz’ law (Mohr, 2004). Both, the first and the second reform did not 
depend on the approval of the Federal Council of the Germany. 
Wolfgang Clement, while promoting approval in parliament for the law, highlighted the two main 
objectives of the third and fourth ‘Hartz’ reform. At first, he emphasised on the importance of 
restructuring the Federal Agency for Jobs (BT, Plenarprotokoll 15/67) to guarantee the reforms 
implemented with the first and the second ‘Hartz’ reforms (Mohr, 2004). Moreover, maybe more 
importantly, he promotes the merging of Unemployment assistance and welfare assistance 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe and Sozialhilfe) to create a new mindset in German labour market policy (BT, 
Plenarprotokoll 15/67). 
The latter point promoted by Clement has been the by far biggest incision made in the ‘Hartz’ laws. 
In the vernacular, these reforms are called ‘Hartz 4’ because the fourth reform was the most 
controversial and it even reignited the ‘Montagsdemonstrationen’, which originate from the 
demonstrations at the end of the GDR, to protest against the labour market reforms (Landeszentrale 
Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, n.d.). The classical unemployment assistance got abolished 
and the new Unemploymentbenefits II (Arbeitslosengeld II) got introduced. Within the newly 
emerged ALG II former receiver of unemployment assistance get the same amount of money as 
people receiving social assistance. The welfare system got simplified and brought together into one 
coherent system. In addition, every job they are mentally and physically capable of is considered 
reasonable for recipients of ALG II. Juveniles younger than 25 emerged as a new target group. They 
only get support when they accept an offer by the Federal Agency for Jobs, which the Federal 
Agency for Jobs is obligated to within the framework of the Employment Guarantee 
(Beschäftigungsgarantie). Not only juveniles, but also older unemployed get stronger in the focus. 
They are now stronger part of activation measures than before. Also, the duration in which 
unemployed get unemployment benefits has been decreased to 12 months if the unemployed is 
below 55 and 18 months if the unemployed is older. The regulations for part-time work for older 
employees has been lifted, which made the labour market more flexible for older employees 
significantly (BT-Drucksache, 15/1638; Mohr, 2004). 
 4.3 Classification of Reforms into Paradigms  
At this point it is time for a first résumé to evaluate whether or not the policies in the era Schröder 
constitute a paradigm shift compared to the policies implemented in the era Kohl. The paradigm 
shift we are interested in, and which has been executed by, for instance Denmark and the 
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Netherlands in the 90s, is the shift from a Keynesian employment strategy towards a neoliberal 
market strategy or if all reforms can be understood in the ordoliberal paradigm. This chapter will 
start with a comparison of the neoliberal and the Keynesian paradigm before it will conclude with a 
classification of the reforms within the ordoliberal paradigm. 
The neoliberal paradigm believes that full employment can be achieved through flexible wage 
levels and the focus fully lies on the first labour market and to match people with existing positions. 
In the German case, it is also observable that a low wage sector gets strongly promoted. The 
Keynesian strategy sees imperfections in capital and goods markets and, contrary to the neoliberal 
view, sees the state in charge of intervene on those imperfections. The state usually does that via a 
demand side stimulation of the economy (Bieback, 1996/97). The ordoliberal paradigm has been 
discussed in some greater detail above. To recap Hall, a first order change is when instruments only 
get adjusted, a second order change is when instruments change but the goal remains the same and a 
third order change, a paradigm shift, is present when goals and instruments change and a new 
ideational background the driving force behind the reforms is (1993). 
Looking at the reforms implemented by the Kohl cabinet, we see mostly cuts and adjustments in the 
instruments at that time. The slogan of the Kohl government in the beginning is high employment 
levels with avoiding precarious jobs (Oschimanski et al., 2007). It becomes most obvious when 
looking at the First and Second Law to implement a Cut, Consolidation and Growth Programme. 
The instruments did not change, it was a pure adjustment of instruments already present, such as the 
reduction of the unemployment benefits and therefore we can see a first order change. The early 
retirement reform introduced can be seen as a second order change. While the goals remained the 
same, full employment, a new instrument got implemented to decrease the number of unemployed.  
The Budget laws and the shift towards the insurance principle, meaning the shift of responsibilities 
from the state towards the employees’ side can be seen as a cut in expenses by the government. It 
could be argued that the shift of responsibilities is a change in instruments but importantly to note is 
that it is certainly not a third order change.  
The Labour Promotion Law and the reform for unemployment aid which are characterised by 
mainly cuts in services can therefore be classified as first order changes as well.  
The transition from AFG to SGB III however is labelled as a paradigm shift in the literature 
(Bieback, 1996/97; Oschimanski et al., 2007). Bieback goes even further and states that the SGB III 
simply is the result of multiple adjustments of the AFG starting from the 1960s (1996/1997). The 
new goal of the SGB III is not to match unemployed with a job that guarantees social security, but 
an accelerated matching with a job in the first labour market and an extensive extension of the low 
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wage sector (Oschimanski et al., 2007). The reason behind this paradigms shift identifies Bieback 
as the problem that active labour market policies do not create regular jobs in times with a 
permanent lack of jobs. The only thing the state can do, however, is to support the mechanisms of 
the labour market to match the existing jobs with unemployed (1996/97). 
The Schröder cabinet, starting with decreasing pension benefits for people in unemployment 
assistance, however, is in line with the Keynesian paradigm. Or, more precise, it is a first order 
change within the paradigm. Again, it only constitutes an adjustment of already existing labour 
market instruments which only qualifies as a first order change.  
The active job law introduced several new instruments which were designed in a way that they cope 
better with the neoliberal paradigm than the Keynesian one. Job rotation is such an instrument 
implemented with the ‘Job-Aqtiv’ law. It subsidises employers that allow their employees to 
undertake further training measures and hire unemployed workers in the meantime. On the one 
hand, further training pre-emptively helps to keep unemployment low because workers have a 
higher qualification and on the other hand unemployed getting work experience in the labour 
market. The new legislation also moves away from early retirement programs for older unemployed 
workers towards aiming for a higher matching rate for those workers. Moreover, companies with 
less than 21 workers are now also allowed to pay short-term wages. Through that it has been made 
possible to design wages more flexible. Pre-emptive measures have also been increased for workers 
which are threatened by unemployment in the near future (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2001). Even though 
the ‘Hartz’ reforms in Germany were the ones that generated the biggest outcry in the population 
and the biggest response in the scientific literature (Krebs and Scheffel, 2013; Neugart, 2005; 
Oschmayer, and Mauer and Schulze Buschoff, 2016 to just name a few), the ‘Job-Aqtiv’ law 
already constitutes a paradigm shift towards the neoliberal paradigm. The newly introduced 
instruments don't see imperfect labour markets and aim to correct them, like the Keynesian 
paradigm dictates but to smoothen out and remove friction in the mechanisms of the labour market 
as promoted by the neoliberal paradigm.  
The ‘Hartz’ reforms follow the path paved by the ‘Job-Aqtiv’ law. The first legislation passed 
implemented PSAs. They as well fit within the new paradigm of neoliberal labour market policy 
and is in accordance with its promoted goals. Short-term labour has the advantage that firms can 
regulate their labour demand more flexible. Also, the worker earns as wages at least what he got as 
unemployment aid or unemployment assistance, which is usually below the wages paid if the 
company would hire a regular worker. Beneficial is that such positions are socially insured.  
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The main contribution of the second ‘Hartz’ law was the promotion for setting up business out of 
unemployment. Promoting of self-employment is in line with the neoliberal paradigm as well. The 
subsidies are not creating jobs directly but help people during the transition phase of finding their 
place in the labour market. Such subsidies rely on labour market forces rather than seeing labour 
markets as incomplete.  
The third ‘Hartz’ reform is mostly concerned with the restructuring of the Federal Agency for Jobs. 
The goal is to move from “administering […] towards matching” (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 15/67: 
5738). This is more in line with a neoliberal paradigm than with a Keynesian paradigm. However, 
the need to increase matching rates could point towards imperfect markets and therefore more 
towards a Keynesian paradigm. 
Contrary to the prior ‘Hartz’ reforms, the fourth bundle can be seen as a first or second order 
change. The merging of unemployment assistance and welfare aid is only up to debate, because 
whether a merging of formerly two separate support pillars into one is a new tool or an adjustment 
of one, or two in this case. After the merger unemployment assistance is at the same level as welfare 
assistance, which means for most unemployment assistance receiver a significant worsening of their 
financial situation. Even though it might not constitute a third order change according to Hall 
(1993), it is a deviation from the institutional path of a three-tier system towards a two-tier system 
(Oschimanski et al., 2007). The fourth ‘Hartz’ reform consists furthermore out of sever cuts in 
transfers paid. It therefore consists out of first order changes. However, juveniles and older 
unemployed are more taken into focus in the ‘Hartz’ legislation. The new target group seems to be 
in line with the neoliberal paradigm rather than the Keynesian one but at the same time applying 
instruments that already exist and solely extend it to different groups appears to be, at its core, a 
first order change. However, adjustments such as the extension of instruments, when created under 
the new paradigm, can already be seen as a first order change in the neoliberal paradigm.  
The ambiguous nature of the labour market reforms from 1990 onwards until 2005 depict nicely the 
incremental change German labour market policy is undergoing (Schmid, 2006). The labour market 
reforms from 2003-2005 always appear as exceptional, and in some respects, they are, such as the 
use of an expert commission or the scope of reforms, but at the same time many elements that 
remind of the Bismarckian model are apparent (Schmid, 2006; Clasen and Goerne, 2011). Looking 
at the reforms from 1990 on until 2005 from an ideational perspective the evidence suggests that the 
neoliberal paradigm has been present at least since the transition from AFG towards SGB III in the 
Kohl cabinet. Bieback states the transition from AFG towards SGB II is solely the final destination 
of an ideational journey that started with the introduction of the AFG in 1969 (1996/97). Even 
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though there seems to be a consensus in the literature that the ‘Hartz’ reforms are indeed a paradigm 
shift towards the neoliberal paradigm, in order not to produce a suggestive interpretation, it is 
subject to debate (Clasen and Goerne, 2011, Schmid, 2006).   
However, it can be argued that this twofold view on the labour market reforms is too narrow. It 
neglects an important paradigm which has been strongly promoted in Germany already prior World 
War 2, but especially after, the ordoliberal paradigm. As Matthijs puts it: “[T]he Hartz reforms 
where injecting a serious ordoliberal dose of market-enhancing competition into the German 
economy” (2016). There is dissension how to classify the German labour market reforms in the 
literature. However, ordoliberalism sees the importance of both, the room of state intervention and 
the freedom of market mechanisms and competition. The reforms described above seem to fit in 
both. Because a classification with the help of only one paradigm, the neoliberal or the Keynesian 
one, will always leave the researcher puzzled. He will not be able to explain the turn towards state 
intervention, even in the ‘Hartz’ laws or, the other way around, neoliberal elements such as a focus 
on matching rates rather than only sustain the unemployed. Even though in the ‘Hartz’ reforms have 
been severe cuts, the role of the state is still big and the levels of security are too high to be fully in 
agreement with the neoliberal set of ideas. At the same time, as Bieback pointed out, there has been 
a leaning towards competition and neoliberal ideas since the 60s (1996/97). This seems not puzzling 
at all, when considering the appreciation of market mechanisms by the ordoliberal paradigm. 
To recap, ordoliberalism sees the state in a positive role and sees interdependencies between the 
market economy, cultural and social spheres (Siems and Schnyder, 2013). Siems and Schnyder also 
point out that in the ordoliberal view markets are not naturally given but made and require 
intervention. They promote a small state as well, which, though, is strong in intervening in certain 
areas (2014). With taking ordoliberalism into regard when looking at the labour market reforms 
from both the Kohl government and the Schröder government, the question whether or not a 
paradigm shift happened becomes obsolete. What can be concluded, however, is that there has been 
a difference in weighing the ideas within the ordoliberal paradigm. SPD seems to value the 
neoliberal parts of the ordoliberal paradigm higher than the Keynesian parts. 
5 How ideas are Conveyed 
In the following chapter the gathered evidence will be evaluated. It is hypothesised that Schröder 
managed to implement structural reform because he was able to build a stronger coordinative 
discourse and employ ideational power that promoted change rather than continuity. This section 
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will provide an analysis of how Schröder employed ideational power and will link it to subgoals in 
the ordoliberal paradigm. The main argument here why Schröder was able to implement the reforms 
and not Kohl is that the Kohl cabinet lacked a set of ideas that differed from the existing 
distribution of weights and subgoals within the paradigm as well as the ideational power to 
incorporate new ideas into the ordoliberal paradigm. The Schröder cabinet, which will be seen 
below, had both. 
A comprehensive ideational picture of each of the chosen reforms will be depicted and in a 
concluding section of a comparative nature both reforms will be compared in their similarities and 
differences, not in a substantial way, but in an ideational way to elucidate the ideational power 
processes during the reforms. 
  
 5.1. ‘AFRG’ 
Starting point of this analysis are the official documents gathered. The basic programme will be 
analysed at first, followed by the election campaign programme of 1994 and the government 
declaration after winning said election. Finally, the parliamentary debate about the AFRG will be 
looked at. This chapter aims to shed light on the ways ideas are conveyed and what kind of 
narratives, arguments and ideational elements are used. 
  
 5.1.1 Basic Programme 
Our analysis is guided by our interest, which of course, guides us towards the parts about the labour 
market in the basic programme. Here we can read that the targeted economic system is neither a 
planned economy, nor a liberal laissez faire. It is rather a mixture of justice, solidarity and freedom 
(Grundsatzprogramm, 1994). This aligns perfectly with our analysis earlier — the reforms by the 
Kohl government can be classified as ordoliberal and the described goals in the basic programme 
can also be classified as ordoliberal. Personal responsibility and free markets are emphasised as 
well as it has to co-exist with social security. A state, not interfering much, but in the cases he does 
interfere, he has a lot of impact, again, perfectly aligned with the ordoliberal paradigm. After the 
conclusions of the preceding analysis have been confirmed, this part is about how those ideas are 
conveyed. The general opinion towards ordoliberalism is justified with Christian values 
(Gundsatzprogramm, 1994: 40) and they create a narrative in which the system is praised 
historically, from its emergence till now, how it is used by other countries as well and how they 
established it against great resistance [by the opposition] (Grundsatzprogramm, 1994: 44f). A slight 
shift of responsibility away from the state towards the individual is justified with the increasing 
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prosperity in the country. However, this shift towards more responsibility for the individual has 
never been fully accomplished in labour market policies. It promotes privatisation and a small state 
quota. The basic programme also offers another narrative, which was used throughout the Kohl era: 
Germany´s competitiveness as a location needed to be improved in order to keep up with the 
challenges that were coming in form of the EU and its open market economy and proceeding 
globalisation (Grundsatzprogramm, 1994: 44). The basic programme tries to tie its policy vision 
mainly to accomplishments in history and tries to generate trust in the abilities gathered in said 
history. Of course, a basic programme cannot be expected to be very specific when it comes to 
concrete policy solutions, however, the message received reading the basic programme is that when 
voting for CDU you vote for continuity. Change is only promoted to fight change coming from the 
outside world in form of the EU, Unification and globalisation. A narrative that promotes continuity 
over change can hardly be expected to create the structural reforms necessary, hence it has 
difficulties establishing a discourse, either communicative or coordinative, that is strong enough to 
overcome institutional obstacles. 
 5.1.2 Election Campaign Programme 
From this very general ideational standpoint the analysis moves now to the election campaign 
programme, which can be expected to be more specific when it comes to concrete policy solutions. 
Strikingly, the competitiveness narrative is quickly revisited in the election campaign programme 
(Regierungsprogramm, 1994: 12). They create an image of Germany as an exporting nation that is 
in its position threatened by North America and South East Asia. After stating that one quarter of all 
jobs in Germany depend on German export, they announce labour market reforms are necessary in 
order to maintain a competitive exporting country. The topic is ubiquitous. Every chapter of the 
labour market section in the election campaign programme refers, in someway or another, to 
German competitiveness. Enterprises are ensured to remain competitive through decreasing tax 
burdens, investments in innovation and even ecological factors are related to competitiveness 
(Regierungsprogramm, 1994). Competitiveness is the main narrative, next to praising the social 
market economy that is used to convince the general public that reform is necessary. Besides 
competitiveness, two stories are told in the election campaign programme about the labour market. 
The first one is about growth and the second one is about modernisation. Both are well chosen 
because you can easily agree on both. More growth, even unevenly distributed, leads to everyone 
having more. Meaning that even the ones losing in society still get more than they did before. And 
modernisation is unspecific enough that everyone can imagine something else. However, all can 
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agree on the term modernisation and that it is a good thing and necessary. CDU is especially 
canvassing for the middle class and their entrepreneurial spirit (Regierungsprogramm 1994: 14). All 
policy suggestions, such as privatisation and tax cuts for enterprises, so they argue, is most 
beneficial for companies of a small and medium size. The middle class has a tradition in Post World 
War Two Germany and is seen as both the engine of German growth and the stabilising factor 
securing social security and equality in Germany. The middle class is what most people in Germany 
can relate to (Regierungsprogramm 1994). The middle class also constitutes what Kohl called the 
political middle. Surprisingly, responsibilities are rarely mentioned. When considering that the 
‘Hartz’ reforms ended up in massively shifting responsibilities towards the individual, the CDU at 
the time appeared to lack the set of ideas to promote such responsibilities what again, is a clue for 
an intra-paradigm shift. Furthermore, there was no shift in sub-goals when looking at 
competitiveness as the main narrative. CDU did not strive to include new ideas into the existing 
paradigm or weigh sub-goals differently and therefore, no discourse that can promote change is to 
be expected. 
 5.1.3 Government Declaration 
Right at the start of Helmut Kohl´s government declaration, he states that the political middle has 
been elected. (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/5). In contrast to the election campaign programme, in the 
government declaration Kohl emphasises on the responsibility every individual bears when it is 
about designing and changing Germany. What appears to be a shift towards self-responsibility is 
only a rejection of the own responsibilities. And Kohl continues with regard to the labour market. 
He argues that no democratic government in the world is able to achieve labour for everybody all 
by themselves (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/5: 42). Noteworthy appears that mostly, when the labour 
market and the creation of jobs is mentioned, responsibility is shifted away from the government 
towards trade unions, states and municipalities. The general attitude, as elucidated when Kohl talks 
about labour market flexibility, is that existing instruments are plenty and sufficient, yet they are not 
excessively used. This rhetorical strategy creates pressure on other policy actors and rather than 
convincing in a coordinative discourse (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/5: 45). And it is no sign of 
recognising the relevance of new ideas or weights within a paradigm but rather relying on the 
existing ones. Similarly, he complains about expectation in the government and its tasks, but at the 
same time states that people are not ready to put self-interest aside and act in pursuit of the common 
good. Kohl talks about responsibility in a way that suggests the state has done enough, or even 
further, needs to do less and the general public has to step up and take on those responsibilities. This 
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strategy is pursued not only in labour market policies but also in social policies as a whole (BT-
Plenarprotokoll, 13/5). This way of reasoning also comes to use when Kohl talks about innovation 
and education. 
Norbert Blüm, Minister for labour and social affairs, pursues a different strategy. He mainly points 
out mistakes and contradictory statements by his political opponents in order to discredit their 
policy solutions (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/6) Blüm, for instance, takes up again a story of a preceding 
speaker about a textile worker losing her job in one city and moves far away for another job in a 
different city to become a maid brought up by a preceding speaker and uses it in favour of his own 
argument (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/6: 186). His speeches contain a lot of shaming of others, not 
letting their ideas come to pass and Blüm often achieves it through the use of irony (BT-
Plenarprotokoll, 13/6). He uses metaphors such as marketplaces of election and workshops of 
problem solving (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/6: 184) and comparisons to reduce suggestions of the 
opposition to absurdity (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/6: 184). Blüm is exerting power over ideas by 
blocking other ideas from entering the ‘marketplace of ideas’. Furthermore, he uses words with 
strong negative connotations such as “ghettos” (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/6: 184) as soon as he 
opposes an idea. Looking the word up in a German dictionary, the first meaning suggested is 
“locked quarter in which the Jewish population lives separated from the rest” (Duden, 2017). It is 
tough to object which such statements given the German history in the Second World War. 
Additionally, Blüm lists failures of the opposition whether they are about the nature of their 
approaches to solutions (too philosophical, too theoretical) or about cutting semi-skilled 
occupations in car manufacturing. The latter he connects with a story about his own origins (BT-
Plenarprotokoll, 13/6: 185). While Kohl appeals toward general trends and characteristics, Blüm 
has a way of specifically shaming others, while at the same time, only offering very limited 
solutions himself. Fitting this behaviour into the continuity vs. change dichotomy, it can be 
concluded that he has quite successful strategies in preventing other ideas to enter the ‘marketplace 
of ideas’, which promotes continuity of the momentarily dominant paradigm, but Blüm has less 
successful measures when it comes to promoting change. The least that can be said is that he is not 
promoting change with his chosen strategy. 
 5.1.4 ‘AFRG’ Debate 
The last official document chosen for the Kohl cabinet is the second and third consultation about 
the ‘AFRG’ in the German parliament. In focus again is the speech given by Norbert Blüm. The 
first version of the ‘AFRG’ was rejected in the Federal Council of Germany. The ‘AFRG’ law is 
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seen as a paradigm shift (Oschimanski et al., 2007). This study does not agree with this point of 
view though it does admit that it constitutes an intra-paradigm shift. However, the reform is not a 
structural one in contrast to the ‘Hartz’ reforms. As we recall, a structural reform is usually 
associated, when related to the power debate, with power through ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt, 
2016). Blüm´s predominant speech patterns, however, are barely about promoting change and 
convincing others of the beneficial contribution a certain idea has. Rather he prevents the fruitful 
discourse with his political opponents and tries to reduce their ideas to absurdity. The central 
hypothesis of this study is that the use of ideational elements in a convincing manner, meaning 
power through ideas, leads to a structural reform. Though, since the ‘AFRG’ law does not qualify as 
a structural reform, it is hence expected to see such speech patterns associated with power over 
ideas in this official document analysed as well as it could be found in the preceding documents. 
After the analysis of the preceding documents it would have been surprising if the ‘AFRG’ law had 
posed a structural reform. Almost no signs of new ideas incorporated into the paradigm, no shift of 
weights in sub-goals and very little use of power through ideas have been found in the documents 
under scrutiny. 
One example can be found that would qualify as power through ideas. Blüm tries to convince the 
opposition why the level of appropriateness can and should be decreased. He firstly values labour as 
something beyond monetary value but also something ideally valuable. Blüm further argues that a 
job that pays as much as unemployment benefits would pay has higher value than unemployment 
benefits (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/155: 12891). The remainder of his speech follows old patterns. 
Shaming of opponents, discrediting other ideas and comparisons reduce other ideas than his own to 
absurdity. This continues in the final consultation of the ‘AFRG’ law where Blüm tries to blame 
social partners such as employer associations for not taking on enough responsibility. 
After talking about what kind of power was used to convince others from a certain set of ideas 
across documents, the quality of arguments through which those ideas are conveyed has not been 
discussed yet. In short: not many arguments have been made across the documents under review. 
However, if arguments were found they were mostly of a normative nature such as, everybody 
should have a job (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/155; BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/6). When linking ideas to 
the social market economy, Kohl argues in a normative manner, when he states, for instance, that all 
social partners should bare their share of responsibility and should not block reforms 
(Regierungsprogramm, 1994). One argument that could be classified as cognitive is Blüm 
discussing the value of labour, even though he is discussing tangibles, the argument is based on 
cognitive reasoning (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 13/155). 
!40
 5.2 ‘Hartz 4’ 
The analysis of Gerhard Schröder´s reform follows the same structure as the one of the ‘AFRG’ 
implemented by the Kohl government. Starting point are the official documents gathered. The 
counterpart of Kohl´s basic programme is the Schröder-Blair Memorandum, which will be analysed 
first in order to establish the set of ideas the Schröder government follows. From there on, 
documents such as the election campaign documents and the debate about the fourth ‘Hartz’ law 
will provide more specific evidence towards how they plan on translating their ideas into policies 
and how they convey their ideas to other political elites and the general public as well as possible 
shifts in the weight of sub-goals within the ordoliberal paradigm. 
  
 5.2.1 Schröder-Blair Memorandum  
Essentially, the programmes of CDU and SPD are similar. Both conjure the social market economy 
as their economic system of choice, both are in favour of competition and, as a state, aim to help the 
and guide the market, rather than replace it and both can be placed within the ordoliberal paradigm. 
Similar challenges are noticed, such as ecological sustainability, the EU and its open economy and 
the situation in the labour market in Germany. However, a first difference can be noted here. SPD 
frames those challenges in a more positive way. Jobs and prosperity need to be fostered and 
everyone should be enabled to develop themselves to their full potential (Schröder-Blair 
Memorandum, 1999: 1). Schröder and Blair furthermore try to place social democrats as proponents 
of meritocracy to emphasise on the responsibilities of the individual. This emphasis on individual 
responsibilities, though, reads more like appreciation of the performance of an individual person 
(Schröder-Blair Memorandum, 1999: 2). The shift of responsibilities that we will ultimately see in 
the ‘Hartz’ reforms is already embedded in the Memorandum. This shift towards social 
responsibility is also a shift in the relative weight of sub-goals within a paradigm. Unlike Kohl, who 
uses the turn towards responsibility to defend the political status quo, Schröder utilises the shift 
towards personal responsibilities to re-shape the labour market in a more flexible manner. Social 
services cannot be measured in quantity, but in its ability to enable people to help themselves. The 
state’s role is to set a playing field in which individuals are equally well-equipped to achieve their 
set goals (Schröder-Blair Memorandum, 1999: 2). Here, another difference emerges in the weight of 
sub-goals. A different definition of equality is put in place. Schröder does not try to equalise the end 
result, but tries to even out chances at the start. While the CDU created a narrative of 
competitiveness, the SPD tells a story of responsibilities. The first part of the Memorandum 
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establishes a turn towards markets in an almost laissez-faire manner and the emphasis on 
responsibilities over state interaction, which as well constitutes an intra-paradigm shift. 
Schröder and Blair argue for a combination of both supply side and demand side stimulation. This 
view is extended to all economic policies. The cognitive argument made by Schröder and Blair is 
that through a more flexible supply side, specifically in the capital, product and labour market a 
boost in the economy can be achieved. The argument is cognitive because they embed their 
suggestions in modern macroeconomic theory (Schröder-Blair Memorandum 1999: 5). The 
narrative of responsibility returns when labour market problems are issued: “[…] transform the 
safety net of claims into a springboard of personal responsibility” (Schröder-Blair Memorandum, 
1999: 7). Not only is the framing of personal responsibilities more positive than compared with 
Kohl´s framing, but also the framing of unemployment understood as a chance for further 
qualification is a peculiar, but yet positive view on unemployment (Schröder-Blair Memorandum, 
1999: 8). The message send in the Schröder-Blair Memorandum is very different from the basic 
programme of the CDU. The former suggests what policy change it can bring and how that 
(positively) effects the individual, while the latter is more concerned with the instruments it has 
already created and which need to be used by the individuals and enterprises. 
 5.2.2 Election Campaigns of 1998 and 2002 
The preceding chapter already showed a difference in the way ideas are conveyed. Different types 
of arguments have been made and different narratives have been conjured. Noteworthy however, 
are two striking similarities in the beginning of the 1998 election campaign of SPD to the 1994 
election campaign of CDU. The latter, as well as the former, conjure the necessity of growth and a 
modernisation of the welfare state (Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, 1998: 14). The growth 
narrative relates well to the golden age of welfare states, where state expansion and economic 
growth accompanied each other. The narrative about modernisation is well chosen, because of its 
vagueness.  
While the CDU saw threats in globalisation and the urgency to adapt according to such change, 
SPD sees chances (Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, 1998: 14) in external change such as 
globalisation. These varying interpretations of globalisation send two different messages. Adapting 
according to change reads more like damage control, while seeing a chance in change reads more 
like exploiting a change in your favour. Whether or not one is more or appealing than the other, 
needs to be judged by each person individually, however, embracing change rather than continuity 
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allows for establishing a discourse in which change is a feasible option. The narrative of chances 
occurs and unfolds across topics. The attentive reader encounters it in the context of globalisation, 
service sectors, information society and the European Union (Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, 
1998).  
The structure of the overall argument is similar compared to the election campaign of CDU from 
1994. The overarching normative argument is that there should be full employment. No 
unemployment relates to the boom years of the 50s and 60s in Germany. At the same times there 
have been a lot of ascents in the society (Nachtwey, 2016). How to achieve this goal is explained in 
cognitive arguments in a cause and effect description of policy solutions (Arbeit, Innovation und 
Gerechtigkeit, 1998). The boom years are also related to a functioning welfare state. They argue 
that high rates of unemployment undermine the functionality of the welfare state (Arbeit, 
Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, 1998). While at first this seems to be preserving the status quo, the 
means to achieve this, however, are new. The normative argument that there should be 
unemployment, relates to the cognitive argument what has to be done in order to achieve said 
normative goal. 
“The points are set” is how the chapter of the labour market is introduced in the 2002 election 
campaign of SPD (Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt - Wir in Deutschland, 2002: 26). This image 
strives to point out multiple things. Points lead us on different tracks leading us in a possibly totally 
different direction. It is a path changing moment when passing those points and according to SPD 
they have been set (into a better labour market future) already. Every change coming from now on 
is unavoidable and necessary (Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt - Wir in Deutschland, 2002). The 
dominant narrative in the 1998 election campaign has been the issue of responsibility. In the 2002 
election campaign this focus shifts towards flexible markets on the supply side. The labour market, 
product markets and capital markets need to be shaped in a flexible manner (Erneuerung und 
Zusammenhalt - Wir in Deutschland, 2002). This new narrative permeates the whole election 
campaign programme. Whenever in the 1998 election campaign programme chances where 
mentioned, it is now substituted by markets that need to be created in a more flexible manner 
(Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt - Wir in Deutschland, 2002). This turn towards creating a greater 
flexibility is also a shift in sub-goals that translate into different policies. For instance, the decrease 
in criteria of appropriateness for new jobs that unemployed have to take on. This poses only an 
adjustment in instruments already in existence; however, the emphasis on self-employment is rather 
new. 
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The maybe most important statement in the 2002 election campaign is that the government has 
installed a commission for modern services on the labour market ‘Hartz’ commission. This is not 
exactly a cognitive argument, though it means introducing expertise into policy making that is 
guided by industry, trade unions and science and has been unprecedented in the last 30 years of 
German history (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 15/5: 179). The type of power exerted can be classified as 
power through ideas. Policy solution are conveyed in cognitive arguments and it is simultaneously 
explained how they are advantageous for the target group. 
 5.2.3 Government Declaration 1998 
Gerhard Schröder opens his speech with a stylistic device. He lists the urgent topics in ascending 
order with the labour markets coming in last (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 14/3: 48). Same as Helmut Kohl, 
does Gerhard Schröder conjure the creative forces in Germany, but unlike Kohl, the government 
takes on responsibilities as well (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 14/3). The self-description given in the speech 
is one of change and departure (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 14/3). Most striking are the different types of 
messages sent from the Kohl government compared to the Schröder government. While Kohl insists 
on everyone doing their part to overcome challenges in the labour market, Schröder almost 
exclusively sends we-messages. Schröder has a much more pro-active stance in the way he conveys 
his ideas compared to Kohl. After Kohl declaring the political mid responsible for emerging 
victorious out of the 1994 elections, Schröder frames his politics as a policy of the new mid. This 
relates to Kohl´s political mid and helps establishing a communicative discourse. Even people that 
voted for Kohl can relate to this and so better accept and support Schröder´s policies. Additionally 
to the narratives Schröder unfolds in his speech, he presents the government as a strong proponent 
of market mechanisms and competition. Most of his arguments are based in economical reasoning. 
Schröder creates an image of himself and his party as one with great expertise in the economical 
sector (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 14/3). Such an image helps to convince others that the government is 
able to reform the labour market. With this image, he is building on both the communicative and the 
coordinative discourse. Another rhetorical stratagem is that Schröder first lists all the things the 
government can and will do before he demands the help of all economical actors to tackle the 
challenge unemployment. In contrast to Kohl, who demanded such contributions right from the 
beginning. 
Walter Riester´s speech, the Minister for labour and social affairs in the Schröder cabinet 1998, 
differs substantially from the speech of the former Minister for labour and social affairs Norbert 
!44
Blüm. He pursues a strategy that is not based in shaming others, but based in promoting credibility. 
He tries to achieve that through making himself accountable for the results of the labour market 
policies (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 14/3). 
 5.2.4 Government Declaration 2002 
The mode of messaging didn’t change substantially from the declaration of 1998. For this reason, 
only the part about the Hartz commission which was installed at the end of the first Schröder 
cabinet will be examined in addition to the speech of Wolfgang Clement, the new Minister of labour 
and social affairs. The suggestions made by Peter Hartz and his commission are the main body of 
the labour market policies Schröder talks about. Most noticeable is Schröder´s borrowing form 
Kennedy´s “ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your 
country” (Kennedy, 1961). Schröder slightly changes it when he asks, “It is not about to ask what is 
impossible. It is rather about to ask, what every single one of us can do to make it possible” (BT-
Plenarprotokoll, 15/4: 54). Besides that, he builds a cognitive argument of how the reform will 
make the labour market more flexible, how the PSA´s are redesigned and how it not only increases 
the matching rate of the Federal Agency for Jobs but also creates new jobs (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 
15/4: 53). Here both power through ideas can be observed and a shift in sub-goals within the 
ordoliberal paradigm.  
Analysing the speech of Wolfgang Clement, Minister for labour and social affairs, we can find 
similar patterns compared to Norbert Blüm. He reacts towards criticism on the ‘Hartz’ concept not 
contentual but criticises merely the way the criticism is raised (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 15/5). Thus, it is 
preventing other ideas from floating around in the debate. Clement utilises here power over ideas. 
The ‘Hartz’ concept has already been presented and therefore it is sensible that the mode of arguing 
for the ‘Hartz’ law changed. Declared goal of the ‘Hartz’ laws is to strengthen personal 
responsibilities amongst employees and unemployed. Clement gives a multi-faceted argument 
starting with a French social critic who sees that non-participation is a trend in our society. This 
trend needs to be fought back by everyone. The ‘Hartz’ concept is convenient, so he argues, because 
it has been signed by all social groups and is therefore representing the “professionals of the nation” 
(BT-Plenarprotokoll, 15/5: 179). The law, as seen here, is not the result of a democratic process it is 
instead a democratic process itself. It is difficult to condemn democracy and that is why this 
argument is so well chosen. In general, the messages sent over the two terms are very consistent. 
The goals are to achieve a more flexible labour market, encourage and demand and more self-
responsibilities are mentioned across documents and cabinets. The shift in sub-goals within the 
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ordoliberal paradigm is manifesting itself in the speech patterns of key actors concerned with the 
labour market. 
 5.2.5 ‘Hartz 4’ Debate 
The ‘Hartz’ reform consists of four laws. The first two were implemented at the beginning of the 
second term of Schröder and the third and fourth law were implemented in January 2005. The latter 
is in focus of this analysis. To be more precise, the second and third consultation in the German 
parliament will be depicted. We expect to find use of power of the category of power through ideas, 
especially, because both laws were subject to approval of the Federal Council of Germany. Clement 
mentions right at the start that the two core issues, the restructuring of the Federal Agency for Jobs 
and the conflation of social assistance and unemployment assistance, are rather technical. But it will 
lead us to a new thinking and acting on the labour market (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 15/67). In very 
technical and scientific fields, we often find power over ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). With 
stating that the new ‘Hartz’ reform is very technical, Clement puts himself in a position in which he 
can understand and explain it to the public and with that, he obtains power over ideas in this 
particular discourse. He continues to build a narrative around the ‘Hartz’ laws and starts with the 
first two that were implemented in January 2003. He lists the new instruments introduced by the 
two laws and their success, however he admits that they could not unfold their full potential. Here 
he argues, that the ‘Hartz’ laws were all developed as one concept and depend on each other. 
Clement creates an almost path-dependent necessity. This notion gets reinforced, when Clements 
mentions the instruments introduced with the first two laws as steps. Steps are clearly referring 
towards a process that is not yet completed. Equally interesting is, what kind of figures Clement 
uses to substantiate his claim that the first two ‘Hartz’ laws being a success. He mentions the 
employment threshold that has been reduced from 2,5% to 1,5%. Choosing numbers holds the 
advantage that they seem very scientific, however, have a great margin of interpretation (Stone, 
2012). For instance, unemployment rates were still equally high at the time of the speech compared 
to the late 90s, but reducing the employment threshold can be counted and presented as a success 
(BT-Plenarprotokoll, 15/67). The use of numbers can also be interpreted as a form of persuasion and 
therefore, power through ideas. Clement also tries to create a party overarching narrative when he 
describes the reform as the conclusion of what all of them have been “preaching” (BT-
Plenarprotokoll, 15/67: 5737). This stylistic stratagem makes it easier for other to be persuaded, 
because it can be perceived as their own idea implemented. Furthermore, Clement tries to create 
consensus when he admits, that certain “clarifications” have been made in consequence of the 
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discussions with the opposition (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 15/67: 5738). Clement also tries to build a 
bridge towards the opposition when he acknowledges and mentions the two core issues in which 
they still differ. But he also says that clarifying those is just a technicality (BT-Plenarprotokoll, 
15/67). The things mentioned are all techniques of persuasion and therefore classify as power 
through ideas. In the preceding chapter it has been substantiated that the ‘Hartz’ reforms pose an 
intra-paradigm shift.  
 5.3 Summary 
Synoptically, a few important differences can be concluded. Firstly, the general mode of messaging 
is different. Schröder and his cabinet propagate messages in which they emphasise on their own 
impact and contribution. They also state that everyone’s help is needed, but first and foremost they 
emphasise on their own possibilities. Kohl and his cabinet did not have such strong messages. The 
legitimacy was rather received from past achievements and that their already introduced 
instruments were sufficient, yet not used by the actors in the labour market. As seen in the ‘Hartz’ 
debate, Clement was insisting on finding consensus and was also willing to move towards the 
opposition for a constructive debate and quick solutions. Blüm, however, said that he misses 
cooperation by the opposition, though he said it in an act of shaming rather than in an act of 
cooperation. 
Consequently, the distribution of cases of power over idea and power through ideas is unbalanced. 
In the analysed Kohl cabinet, much more cases of power over ideas have been found. With the help 
of institutional power the goal appeared to be to prevent new ideas from entering the discourse 
rather than promoting an open discourse, which welcomes all new ideas. In both Schröder cabinets 
persuading elements can be found that promote change over continuity. A preponderance of power 
through ideas is typical for the analysed documents of the Schröder cabinet’s. According to the 
theory outlined above, we expect to find substantial, structural change during the Schröder 
administration and not in the Kohl administration. 
Most striking in the comparison of the Kohl cabinet and the Schröder cabinet are the shift in sub-
goals within the ordoliberal paradigm. Without a set of ideas that promotes different goals than the 
political status quo, structural reform cannot be expected. 
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter elaborates on the concluding remarks of the present study. Most importantly in this 
chapter, the main findings of both analytical chapters will be elucidated and the research questions 
posed at the very beginning of the study will be answered. Furthermore, this research reflects again 
on the societal and scientific relevance of this study. In order to clear the way for future research, 
this research design´s strengths and weaknesses need to be discussed and illuminated to provide 
suggestions for further research. 
 6.1 Paradigms 
With respect to the question whether or not the ‘Hartz’ reforms pose a paradigm shift or not, there 
are two main things to be concluded. There is an ongoing theoretical debate whether or not the 
‘Hartz’ reforms pose a third order change from the Keynesian towards the neoliberal paradigm. In 
this study, it can be shown that the ‘Hartz’ reforms belong to neither of those two paradigms, but 
rather are to be placed within the ordoliberal paradigm. Of course, Keynesian elements, as well as 
neoliberal elements, can be found, but the main ideational background, the ideational driving force 
behind the reform processes is of ordoliberal nature. The second point is not of theoretical but of 
practical nature. It can be shown that the two Schröder cabinets from 1998-2005 compared with the 
last Kohl cabinet from 1994-1998 weigh sub-goals within the paradigm differently. The Schröder 
governments have a stronger emphasis on self-responsibility of the individual, which leads towards 
different policy outcomes in terms of, for instance, a different benefit structure of unemployment 
assistance. Furthermore, this different weighing of sub-goals is an indication towards the question 
why Schröder was able to implement structural reform, while Kohl, at the same time, was not. The 
way Kohl distributed weights on sub-goals were in line with the status quo. For this very reason, 
most of Kohl´s labour market reforms resulted solely in adjusting existing instruments. Schröder´s 
focus on self-responsibility lead towards a smaller state in the labour market. However, a more 
flexible designed labour market does not mean the state’s role becomes obsolete nor does the state 
become invisible or weak. The state still plays a fundamental role in providing the central agency 
for matching unemployed workers with existing jobs, sets incentives for creating self-employment 
and, ultimately, bears the social responsibility for those who are trying, but not succeeding in 
finding a job. The ‘Hartz’ reforms are therefore clearly within the ordoliberal paradigm, which can 
also be concluded for the labour market reforms made in the previous cabinets and thus, the ‘Hartz’ 
reforms do not pose a third order change according to Hall (1993). They do constitute, however, an 
intra-paradigm shift with differently weighed sub-goals.  
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 6.2 How Ideas are Conveyed 
The examination of the ‘Hartz’ reforms by the tools provided by DI and the ideational power debate 
have proven themselves fruitful. Again, two things can be concluded from the analysis of ideas and 
how they are conveyed. Firstly, different types of power can be found. Ideas are mostly conveyed 
through power over ideas in the last Kohl cabinet. This type of power is not so much associated 
with policy change, but with actors being able to ignore ideas brought in by others. One 
characteristic of power over ideas is that actors are present that are usually in quite powerful 
positions. This can be confirmed because the governmental party, the party in charge, is the one 
with the most traditional power resources and power over ideas relates closely to traditional forms 
of power. However, as mentioned earlier, policy change is associated with power through ideas. 
This type of power exertion strives to convince and has a more cooperative notion. Power through 
ideas can be found mostly in the first Schröder cabinet, whilst there is a decline in power through 
ideas in the second term. However, narratives and discourse employed by the Schröder cabinet 
mostly strived for convincing and shifting weights to other sub-goals within the paradigm to 
achieve structural policy change. 
Secondly, ideational elements were put to different uses in both governments. Kohl and in particular 
Blüm were rather promoting continuity than change. Both developed a narrative of responsibilities, 
but both narratives could not be more different form one another. The Kohl cabinet tried to shift 
responsibilities to all the actors involved in the labour market, but themselves, in order to solve the 
disastrous unemployment issues at that time. The Schröder cabinet also promoted more 
responsibilities for individuals, but at the same time framing it as something long overdue. The 
narrative had a spirit of optimism, enabling individuals to get the appreciation they deserve instead 
of vegetating in the shadow of an overwhelming bureaucracy. 
Thus, taking all things into consideration, the striking differences in the coordinative discourses 
between the Schröder and the Kohl cabinets can explain why the ‘Hartz’ reforms happened during 
the Schröder session and not during Kohl´s. 
6.3 Reflection on the Scientific Relevance 
In the theoretical framework it was shown that the turn towards ideas has been widely accepted. 
The agency-centred approach towards institutional change has been appreciated, however, only a 
few endeavours have been undertaken to put this framework at use in a meticulous study. This study 
provides a clear insight into how ideational power is at work and how it can contribute towards 
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explaining policy outcomes, why policy change happened and what happened during policy change. 
This study therefore scales down the gap in the literature between the theoretical insights and the 
practical use of ideational theory.
 6.4 Reflection on the Societal Relevance 
The finding that ideational theories have explanatory power in the policy making process can have a 
great empowering impact on society. Besides the reasons mentioned above, ideational power allows 
for bottom-up processes in the policy process. Taking ideational theories seriously can be seen as a 
renewal of democracy itself because individuals are not restricted to voting once every term, but 
have a constant influence on the policy process. This might be a slight overstatement for individuals 
alone, but already small organised groups can start bottom-up processes that could tip legislation in 
their favour, for instance. Hence, analysing these ideational processes within a polity can create a 
great added value for society as a whole. 
 6.5 Limitations of this Study 
The nature of this study generates a few limitations. The small sample of cases examined and the 
small amount of evidence collected allow for little generalisation and therefore, for a low external 
validity. A low external validity is not necessarily bad when considering the nature of this study. As 
the choice of process-tracing method has shown, this study aims for a single outcome explanation. 
However, more evidence can be collected to ensure a sound causal inference from the cases under 
scrutiny. Especially direct statements of actors in television, newspapers or public events can be 
taken into consideration. Nevertheless, it is important to make sure that the context is taken into 
consideration. 
A second important weakness is the author’s personal bias towards the subject. The author’s 
nationality and language skills certainly help in analysing the documents at hand, however, being 
familiar with the political landscape, personal preferences towards parties have been formed. To 
accept ‘value free’ science in such a setting is impossible. A possible solution could be to only 
analyse foreign countries rather than the country of origin. This could, however, create problems in 
analysing data and draw meaningful connections and conclusions from the evidence examined. 
The analysis was a rather unstructured endeavour. Clarifying concepts further could be of help, but 
rigid concepts would also result in loss of meaning. This study chose a rather unstructured approach 
in analysing the evidence with good results. A sound causal inference was possible and the role of 
ideational power in the policy process could be underlined. 
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 6.6 Further Research 
Hopefully, this study is seen as a starting point for future research on ideational power in policy 
processes. Apart from the shortcomings of this study, this analysis could benefit from a team 
consisting of multiple academic disciplines. Scholars with a background in linguistics, 
communication and cultural studies could be of great use because all of them can contribute with 
their unique knowledge and skillset to reach an even more detailed understanding of ideational 
power at play in policy processes. 
More researchers involved would possibly reduce the researcher’s bias resulted in party 
preferences. An increase in external validity can also be reached if more cases are taken into 
consideration. Structural reforms could be analysed across countries or within one country but 
across time.  
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